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Abstract
Distributed First Order Logic (DFOL) has been introduced more than
ten years ago with the purpose of formalising distributed knowledge-based
systems, where knowledge about heterogeneous domains is scattered into a
set of interconnected modules. DFOL formalises the knowledge contained
in each module by means of first-order theories, and the interconnections
between modules by means of special inference rules called bridge rules.
Despite their restricted form in the original DFOL formulation, bridge rules
have influenced several works in the areas of heterogeneous knowledge in-
tegration, modular knowledge representation, and schema/ontology match-
ing. This, in turn, has fostered extensions and modifications of the original
DFOL that have never been systematically described and published. This
paper tackles the lack of a comprehensive description of DFOL by provid-
ing a systematic account of a completely revised and extended version of the
logic, together with a sound and complete axiomatisation of a general form
of bridge rules based on Natural Deduction. The resulting DFOL frame-
work is then proposed as a clear formal tool for the representation of and
reasoning about distributed knowledge and bridge rules.
1 Introduction
The method of structuring complex knowledge-based systems in a set of largely
autonomous modules has become common practice in several areas such as Se-
∗This paper is a substantially revised and extended version of a paper with the same title pre-
sented at the 1998 International Workshop on Frontiers of Combining Systems (FroCoS’98)
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mantic Web, Database, Linked Data, Ontologies, and Peer-to-Peer systems. In
these practices, knowledge is often structured in multiple interacting sources and
systems, hereafter indicated as local knowledge bases or simply knowledge bases
(KBs). Several efforts have been devoted to provide a well-founded theoretical
background able to represent and reason about distributed knowledge. Several ex-
amples can be found in well established areas of Database and Knowledge Repre-
sentation such as federated and multi-databases [70, 45, 33], database and infor-
mation integration [41, 71, 14, 12, 26, 47], database schema matching [60], and
contextual reasoning [54, 11, 28]. Further examples can also be found in more
recent areas of the Semantic Web, such as ontology matching [68, 21], ontology
integration [49, 44, 65], ontology modularisation [58, 42, 1], linked data [7, 38],
and in Peer-to-Peer systems [6, 23, 37, 13].
The formalisms mentioned above share several aspects: they all focus on static
and boolean knowledge1; local knowledge is expressed using a (restricted form
of) first-order language; each module is associated with a specific (first-order)
language, called local language; the domains of interpretation of the different local
languages can be heterogeneous; the same symbol in different local languages can
have different interpretations; knowledge within the different modules is related
through some form of cross-language axioms. Despite their commonalities, these
formalisms are mainly tailored to the characterisation of specific phenomena of
distributed knowledge. Little work exists on the definition of a general logic,
comprehensive of a sound and complete calculus and of a rigorous investigation
of its properties, as well as able to represent generic semantically heterogeneous
distributed systems, based on first-order logic and comprised of heterogeneous
domains.
As a step towards the definition of such a logic, Distributed First Order Logic
(DFOL) was introduced in [29]. As explained in detail in Section 6.5, the origi-
nal DFOL was able to capture only limited interconnections between local KBs.
Nonetheless, the idea presented in [29] of connecting different domains of inter-
pretation by means of directional domain relations, and a number of unpublished
efforts to substantially extend DFOL to increase its flexibility and expressiveness,
have strongly influenced several frameworks which include Package-Based De-
scription Logics (P-DL) [1], Distributed Description Logic (DDL) [65], and C-
OWL [8].
In this paper we overcome the limitations of the original formulation of DFOL
1It is important to mention here that in this paper we discard aspects tied to the non-monotonic
evolution of knowledge and to its many valued/probabilistic/fuzzy nature.
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and present a systematic account of a completely revised and extended version of
the formalism, which was elaborated in conjunction with most of the efforts listed
above. The unpublished elements described in this paper include: (i) a general
version of bridge rules based on the introduction of arrow variables as a way to
express general semantic relations between local KBs (Section 3); (ii) a notion of
logical consequence between bridge rules (Section 4.4); (iii) a thorough investi-
gation of the properties of DFOL (Section 3) and of how to use it to represent
important types of relations between local KBs (Section 4); and (iv) a general
sound and complete calculus able to capture the semantic relations enforced by
arrow variables, to infer new bridge rules and to discover unsatisfiable distributed
knowledge-based systems (Section 5).
To make the presentation clearer, but also to show the generality of the ap-
proach, we informally describe, and then formalise using DFOL, two examples of
distributed knowledge, namely reasoning with viewpoints, and information inte-
gration. This material is covered in Section 2 (informal presentation) and Exam-
ples 5, 6, and 7 (formalisation using DFOL).
The extended version of DFOL presented in this paper is also used, in Sec-
tion 6, as a framework for the encoding of different static and boolean knowledge
representation formalisms grounded in first-order logic. In line with the work pre-
sented in [68] these formalisms are tailored to the representation of semantically
heterogeneous distributed knowledge-base systems (e.g., ontologies, databases,
and contexts) with heterogeneous domains.
2 Two explanatory examples
The examples introduced in this section are used throughout the paper to discuss
and illustrate the ideas and the formalisation of DFOL we propose.
2.1 Reasoning with viewpoints
Example 1 (The magic box). Consider the scenario in Figure 1a: there are two
observers, Mr.1 and Mr.2, each having a partial viewpoint of a box and of an
indefinite number of balls. The balls can be black or white and the box is com-
posed of six sectors, each possibly containing a ball. Balls can be inside the box
or in the grey area outside the box. From their perspectives observers cannot dis-
tinguish the depth inside the box. Moreover they cannot see balls hidden behind
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(a) The global view. (b) Mr.1 and Mr.2’s points of view.
Figure 1: The magic box.
other balls and balls located behind the box. Figure 1b shows what Mr.1 and
Mr.2 actually see in the scenario depicted in Figure 1a.2
The magic box, together with the balls, represents a “complex” environment
corresponding to the domain of the agents’ local knowledge bases. The agents’
points of view correspond to their local knowledge. The local knowledge of the
agents is constrained one another by the fact that they describe views over the
same environment. Assuming that we have a complete description of the box
we can build the agents’ local knowledge (bases) as views over this complete
description. However, such a complete description is often not available. What
we often have are only the partial views, and a set of constraints between these
views, with no representation of the external world (in our example case, the entire
box). In cases like this we need a logical formalism able to describe the point of
view of the different agents (Mr.1, and Mr.2, in our example) and the constraints
among these views, without having to represent the entire box as we see it in
Figure 1a. The formalism should be able to represent and reason about statements
such as:
1. “the domain of Mr.1 contains 3 balls and a box with 2 sectors”;
2. “Mr.2 sees a black ball in the right sector”;
3. “Mr.1 and Mr.2 agree on the colour of the balls they both see”;
4. “if Mr.1 sees an empty box, then Mr.2 sees an empty box too”;
5. “if Mr.2 sees 3 balls in the box, then the leftmost is also seen by Mr.1”.
This example involves, in a very simple form, a number of crucial aspects of
distributed knowledge representation: first, it deals with heterogeneous local do-
mains which correspond to the different sets of balls in the different viewpoints.
Second, it has to do with cross-domain identity. In fact, we need to represent the
2The example is an extension of the “magic box” example originally proposed in [28].
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connections between the perceptions of the balls by each agent, without having
an objective model that completely and correctly describes all the objects (balls)
present in the box. An example is statement 5 above. Third, we have hetero-
geneous local properties. In our example Mr.1 sees a box composed of two
sectors, while for Mr.2 the box is composed of three sectors. Thus Mr.2 has a a
notion of “a ball being in the central sector” which Mr.1 does not have. Fourth,
it deals with constrained viewpoints. The viewpoints of the agents are, in fact,
not independent, since they are the result of they observing the the environment.
Thus, if Mr.1 sees an empty box, then Mr.2 is constrained to see an empty box
too, as described in statement 4 above.
2.2 Mediator-based Information Integration
Information integration is often based on architectures that make use of a media-
tor [72], as in the following example.
Figure 2: An example of mediator system.
Example 2. Consider the databases of two fruit sellers, Sel .1 and Sel.2, depicted
in Figure 2. The information about fruits sold by Sel .1 is contained in two rela-
tions Available(fruit, qty), and Price(fruit, x) with the intuitive meaning that
a quantity qty of fruit is available for selling and that its price is fixed to x Euros
per kilogram (Eur/Kg for short). The value of x could be a number or an interval
[x1, x2], expressing the fact that a specific price has not been fixed yet but it is
contained within x1 and x2. Sel.2, instead, stores information about fruit prices
in a single relation Available(fruit, qty, x), where x indicates the total price of
quantity qty of fruit, and not its price per kilo. A mediator m collects the data
of Sel .1 and Sel.2 and integrates them into a single relation Offer(fruit , qty , x ),
meaning that a quantity qty of fruit is available at price x Euros per kilo from (at
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least) one of the two sellers. Customers looking for information about fruit prices
can submit a query to the mediator, instead of asking the two sellers separately as
shown in Figure 2.
Even if we discard details on how the information is integrated, and the process
of query-answering is performed, we can observe that a logic for the representa-
tion of such a scenario must be able to represent the heterogeneous schemata and
domains of the three subsystems m, Sel .1 , and Sel.2. In particular the formalism
should be able to represent the following facts:
1. Sel .1 sells “apples”, whereas Sel.2 andm represent the domain of apples at
a greater granularity, and are able to offer specific varieties of apples (rang-
ing among Delicious and Granny Smith in our example). Moreover, for the
sake of the example, the “apples” of Sel .1 correspond to both “Delicious”
and “GrannySmith” in the mediator. This justifies the disjunctive statement
retrieved by the mediator as a “translation” of the statements about apples
contained in the database of Sel .1 ;
2. total prices of Sel.2 are transformed in prices per kilo in m to be homoge-
neous with price format of Sel .1 ;
3. m is not interested in retrieving information about fruits whose price is not
yet defined (lemons in our case);
4. the information goes from Sel .1 (resp. Sel.2) to m and not from the medi-
ator to the sellers.
Again, this example involves heterogeneous local domains and cross-domain
identity, as described in statement 1 above. Moreover, it involves heterogeneous
local properties represented by the different relations, which are nonetheless con-
strained by the fact that they all represent the availability of fruit at a certain price.
Thus, for example, if 10 Kg of oranges cost 20 Euros in the database of Sel.2,
then oranges cost 2 Euros per Kilo in the database of the mediator. In addition,
information is required to be directional: in our example it flows from the sellers
to the mediator and not vice-versa, since the sellers must be prevented to retrieve
knowledge about potential competitors that could be stored in the mediator.
3 Syntax and Semantics of DFOL
In this section we provide the syntax and semantics of Distributed First Order
Logic (DFOL). They are based on the syntax and semantics of first-order logic
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and provide an extension of the Local Models Semantics presented in [28] to the
case where each local KB is described by means of a first-order language.
3.1 DFOL Syntax
Let {Li}i∈I (hereafter {Li}) be a family of first-order languages defined over a
non empty set I of indexes. For the sake of simplicity we assume, without loss
of generality, that all the languages Li contain the same set X of infinitely many
variables. Each language Li is the language used by the i-th local knowledge base
to partially describe the world from its own perspective. For instance, in the magic
box example I = {1, 2}.
In DFOL, each Li is a first-order language with equality, extended with a
new set of symbols, called arrow variables, which are of the same syntactic type
as constants and standard individual variables (hereafter often called non-arrow
variables). Formally, for each variable x ∈ X , and each index i, j ∈ I , with i 6= j,
the signature of Li is extended to contain the two arrow variables
→j
x and
j→
x .
The arrow variables
→j
x and
j→
x in Li intuitively denote an object in the domain
of interpretation of Li that corresponds to the object x in the domain of Lj . The
difference between
→j
x and
j→
x will become clearer later in the paper. We often use
→
x to denote a generic arrow variable (that is, either of the form
→j
x or
j→
x ).
Terms of Li, also called i-terms, are recursively defined as in first-order logic
starting from the set of constants, variables, and arrow variables, and by recur-
sively applying function symbols. Formally:
1. Any constant, variable, and arrow variable of Li is a i-term.
2. If f is a function symbol of arity n in Li and t1, . . . , tn are i-terms, then
f(t1, ..., tn) is a i-term.
Formulas of Li, called i-formulas, are defined as in first-order logic, with the
discriminant that we only quantify over non-arrow variables. Formally:
1. If P is a n-ary predicate symbol inLi and t1, . . . , tn are i-terms, then P (t1, ..., tn)
is a i-formula.
2. If t1 and t2 are i-terms, then t1 = t2 is a i-formula.
3. If φ and ψ are i-formulas, then ¬φ, φ ⊃ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, are i-formulas.
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4. If φ is a formula and x is a non-arrow variable, then ∀xφ and ∃xφ are i-
formulas.
Examples of i-terms are x, c,
→j
x , f(c, d), and f(
j→
x , f(g(d))). Examples of
i-formulas are P (x, y, z), P (
→j
x ,w, a), ⊥ ⊃ P (f(c), d), ∀x.P (x, y), ∀x.x = j→x ,
∃y.P (y,→jx ). Instead ∀j→x .P (j→x ) is not an i-formula as we do not allow quantifi-
cation on arrow variables.
A i-formula φ is closed if it does not contain arrow variables and all the oc-
currences of the variable x in φ are in the scope of a quantifier ∀x or ∃x. φ is open
if it is not closed. A variable x occurs free in a formula if x occurs in φ not in the
scope of a quantifier ∀x or ∃x. Notice that x, →ix and i→x are different variables,
and therefore x does not occur free in an expression of type p(
→i
x ). The notation
φ(x) is used to denote the formula φ and the fact that the free variables of φ are
x = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Languages Li and Lj are not necessarily disjoint and the same formula φ can
occur in different languages with different meanings. A labeled formula is a pair
i :φ3 and is used to denote that φ is a formula in Li. Given a set of i-formulas Γ,
we use i :Γ as a shorthand for the set of labelled formulas {i :γ|γ ∈ Γ}. Note that
we do not admit formulas which are composed of symbols coming from different
alphabets. Thus 1 :P (x) ∧ 2 : a = b and ∀x1 :P (x) are not well-formed labeled
formulas in DFOL.
Example 3 (Languages for the magic box). The DFOL languages L1 and L2 that
describe the knowledge of Mr.1 and Mr.2 in the magic box example are defined
as follows.
• L1 contains an infinite set of constants b1, b2, . . . used to denote balls, two
constants l and r used to indicate the left-hand side and right-hand side
positions in the box, the binary predicate inbox(x, y) which stands for “the
ball x is in the position y of the box”, and the unary predicates white(x)
and black(x) for “the ball x is white” (resp. black).
• L2 is obtained by extending L1 with a new constant c for the centre position
in the box.
Examples of labeled formulas describing the knowledge of Mr.1 and Mr.2 are:
3Similar notations are introduced in [54, 24, 71, 20, 52].
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• “According to Mr.1, ball b3 is in the left slot of the box and ball b1 is the
same as ball b3”
1: inbox(b3, l) ∧ b1 = b3
• “According to Mr.2 all the balls inside the box are black”
2:∀x(∀y inbox(x, y) ⊃ black(x))
3.2 Denoting cross-domain objects
DFOL associates different domains of interpretation to the local knowledge bases;
therefore it needs a mechanism to denote cross-domain identity. Arrow variables
provide such a mechanism, and are used to refer to counterpart objects which
belong to other domains. In particular, arrow variables of the form
j→
x and
→j
x oc-
curring in a i-formula are used to denote an object in the domain of interpretation
of Li, which corresponds to the object denoted by x in the domain of Lj .
Consider, for instance, statement 3 at page 4. The formalisation of this state-
ment requires the ability to represent a ball that is seen by both observers. Since
DFOL represents the partial viewpoints of Mr.1 and Mr.2, each one with its own
domain of interpretation, there is no object that directly represents a ball seen by
both. Indeed, consider the black ball in the corner of the magic box represented
at the top of Figure 3. Mr.1 and Mr.2 have their own representation of this ball
in their different domains, as graphically depicted at the bottom of Figure 3. The
way we represent the connection between these two different objects is by using
an arrow variable, say
→2
x , interpreted in the domain of Mr.1 which corresponds
to the ball denoted by x seen by Mr.2. We can then predicate that both
→2
x and
Figure 3: Denoting cross-domain objects in the magic box example.
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x are black using the formulas 1 : black(
→2
x ) and 2 : black(x). The precise way
in which DFOL binds the interpretation of
→2
x and x in the different domains will
become clear with the definition of Assignment (Definition 4).
The notion of arrow variable introduced here is connected to the notion of
counterparts introduced by Lewis in [48]. Roughly speaking, the language of
Lewis’ Counterpart Theory contains a binary predicate C(x, y) meaning that x
is the counterpart of y, where x and y are supposed to denote two objects in two
different possible worlds. In DFOL, we have local knowledge bases with different
local languages instead of possible worlds. Therefore, we cannot explicitly state
that x is counterpart of y, when x and y belong to two different languages, but
only state it implicitly by means of arrow variables. That is, we can name in the
language Li a counterpart of x in Lj by using the arrow variables
j→
x and
→j
x .
3.3 DFOL Semantics
The semantics of a family of DFOL languages {Li} is defined by associating a set
of interpretations, called local models, to each Li in {Li} and by relating objects
in different domains via, so-called, domain relations. This semantics is an exten-
sion of Local Models Semantics as defined in [28]. If we look at the knowledge
contained in a knowledge base i we can distinguish three cases. First, i can be
complete, that is, for each formula φ ∈ Li either φ or ¬φ belongs to the (deduc-
tive closure of the) knowledge base; second, it can be incomplete, if there exist
at least a formula φ such that neither φ or ¬φ belongs to it; third, it can be in-
consistent, that is, both φ and ¬φ belong to it. To represent these three possible
statuses, each i is associated with a (possibly empty) set of local models. That is,
each i is associated with an epistemic state. A singleton corresponds to a com-
plete KB, the empty set corresponds to an inconsistent KB, whereas all the other
sets correspond to an incomplete KB. While completeness w.r.t. the entire lan-
guage Li may be unrealistic, and even undesirable, it may be a good property to
require for certain types of formulas, as we will see in the following paragraphs.
To characterise the portion of knowledge upon which i has complete knowledge
we introduce the notion of complete sub-language Lci and we restrict the defini-
tion of complete knowledge to the formulas of Lci . Let L
c
i be a sub-language of
Li built from a subset of constants, functional symbols, and predicate symbols of
Li, including equality, plus the set of arrow and not-arrow variables of Li. We
call Lci the complete sub-language of Li. Complete terms and complete formu-
las are terms and formulas of Lci . Otherwise they are called non complete. Note
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that in DFOL Lci must contain the equality predicate as we impose that each i-th
knowledge base is able to evaluate whether two objects are equal or not. Addi-
tional constants, functional symbols, or predicates can be added to Lci to represent
domain-specific complete knowledge. For instance, in the magic box example we
may assume that Mr.1 and Mr.2 have complete knowledge about the position of
the balls. That is, they know if a ball is in a slot or not. On the contrary, assume
that Mr.2’s view over the box is partially concealed by a big wall, as depicted in
Figure 4. In this scenario Mr.2 is able to see one box sector and knows that there
are two sectors behind the wall with balls inside and outside the box. In this case
Mr.2 has complete knowledge about the left hand side position of the box but
is uncommitted to whether there are balls in the sectors behind the wall. This is
formalised by including the formulas inbox(b, l) into Lc2 for all the balls b in the
language of Mr.2, and by letting, e.g., sentences of the form inbox(b, c) to be non
complete, that is, true in some local model of Mr.2 and false in others.
Figure 4: Partial knowledge in the magic box.
Definition 1 (Set of Local Models). A set of local models of Li is a set of first-
order interpretations of Li on a (non empty) domain domi, which agree on the
interpretation of Lci , the complete sub-language of Li.
The semantic overlap between different knowledge bases is explicitly repre-
sented in DFOL by means of domain relations.
Definition 2 (Domain relation). A domain relation rij from domi to domj is a
binary relation contained in domi × domj .
We often use the simpler expression domain relation from i to j to denote a
domain relation rij from domi to domj . We also use the functional notation
rij(d) to denote the set {d′ ∈ domj|〈d, d′〉 ∈ rij}.
A domain relation from i to j illustrates how the j-th knowledge base rep-
resents the domain of the i-th knowledge base in its own domain. Therefore, a
pair 〈d, d′〉 being in rij means that, from the point of view of j, d in domi is the
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representation of d′ in domj . Thus, rij formalises j’s subjective point of view on
the relation between domi and domj , and not an absolute and objective point of
view; this implies that 〈d, d′〉 ∈ rij must not be read as if d and d′ were the same
object in a domain shared by i and j. This latter fact could only be formalised by
an external (above, meta) observer to both i and j.
Domain relations are not symmetric by default. This represents the fact that
the point of view of j over the domain of i may differ from the point of view of i
over the domain of j, which may even not exist. For instance, in the mediator sys-
tem example, it is plausible to impose that m has a representation of the domains
of Sel .1 and Sel.2, in its own domain while the opposite is prevented. Domain
relations are conceptually analogous to conversion functions between semantic
objects, as defined in [64].
Specific relations between the domains of different knowledge bases can be
modelled by adding constraints about the form of rij . For instance, two knowledge
bases with different but isomorphic representations of the same domain can be
modelled by imposing rij = r−1ji . Likewise, completely unrelated domains can be
represented by imposing rij = rji = ∅. Transitive mappings between the domains
of three knowledge bases i, j and k can be represented by imposing rik = rij ◦rjk.
Moreover, if domi and domj are ordered according to two ordering relations <i
and <j respectively, then a domain relation that satisfies the following property
for all d1, d2 ∈ domi, d1 <i d2 →
for all d′1 ∈ rij(d1), for all d′2 ∈ rij(d2). d′1 <j d′2
(1)
formalises a mapping which preserves the ordering. An example of this last prop-
erty is a domain relation that captures a currency exchange function. Further
constraints on rij are discussed in Section 4.
Definition 3 (DFOL Model). A DFOL model, or simply a modelM (for {Li}) is
a pairM = 〈{Mi}, {rij}〉 where, for each i, j ∈ I , Mi is a set of local models
for Li, and rij is a domain relation from i to j.
Example 4. A DFOL model for the scenario shown in Figure 1 is a 4-tuple
M = 〈{m1}, {m2}, r12, r21〉, where m1 = 〈{left , right , a, b, c}, ·I1〉 and m2 =
〈{left , centre, right , a, b, c, d}, ·I2〉 with
·I1=

bI11 = a b
I1
2 = b b
I1
3 = c
inbox I1 = {〈b, left〉, 〈c, right〉}
blackI1 = {a, c}
whiteI1 = {b}
·I2=

bI21 = a b
I2
2 = b
bI23 = c b
I2
4 = d
inbox I2 = {〈a, left〉, 〈b, right〉}
black I2 = {a, b, d}
whiteI2 = {c}
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Moreover, r12 = {(c, a)} and r21 = {(a, c)}.
Definition 4 (Assignment). Let M = 〈{Mi}, {rij}〉 be a model for {Li} and
Xi be a set containing all the non-arrow variables plus a subset of the arrow
variables of Li. An assignment a is a family {ai} of functions ai from Xi to domi
which satisfies the following:
(i) if ai(
→j
x ) is defined, then ai(
→j
x ) ∈ r−1ij (aj(x));
(ii) if ai(
j→
x ) is defined, then ai(
j→
x ) ∈ rji(aj(x)).
The definition above extends the classical notion of assignment given for first-
order logic to deal with extended variables. Intuitively, if the non-arrow variable x
occurring in the j-th knowledge base is a placeholder for the element d ∈ domj ,
then the occurrence of the arrow variable
→j
x in a formula of the i-th knowledge
base is a placeholder for an element d′ ∈ domi which is a pre-image (via r−1ij ) of
d. Analogously, the arrow variable
j→
x occurring in i : ψ is a placeholder for any
element d′′ ∈ domi which is an image (via rji) of d.
An assignment a′ is an extension of a, in symbols a ≤ a′, if ai(v) = d implies
a′i(v) = d for all the non-arrow and arrow variables v. Notationally, given an
assignment a, a (non-arrow or arrow) variable x, and an element d ∈ domi, we
denote with a(x := d) the assignment obtained from a by letting ai(x) = d.
Definition 5 (Admissible assignment). An assignment a is (strictly) admissible
for a formula i :φ if ai assigns all (and only) the arrow variables occurring in φ.
a is (strictly) admissible for a set of formulas Γ if it is (strictly) admissible for all
j :φ in Γ.
Definition 6 (Satisfiability). A formula i : φ is satisfied by a DFOL model M
w.r.t. the assignment a, in symbolsM |= i :φ[a], if
(i) a is admissible for i :φ; and
(ii) for all m ∈ Mi, m |= φ[ai] according to the classic definition of first-order
satisfiability.
M |= Γ[a] if, for all i :φ ∈ Γ,M |= i :φ[a].
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With an abuse of notation we use the symbol |= of satisfiability to denote both
first-order satisfiability and DFOL satisfiability. The context will always make
clear the distinction between the two.
If we compare satisfiability of a formula in a DFOL model with the stan-
dard notion of satisfiability of a first-order formula in a first-order model we can
observe three differences: first, assignments do not force all arrow variables to
denote objects in the domain; second, we admit partial knowledge as we evaluate
the satisfiability of a formula in a set of local models, rather than into a single one;
third, we admit islands of inconsistency, by allowing some Mi to be empty. In the
following we analyse these three aspects one by one.
3.3.1 Satisfiability and arrow variables
Definition 4 requires assignments to be defined for all non-arrow variables, but not
necessarily for all arrow variables.4 To avoid many of the ontological issues raised
by free logics [4], where special truth conditions are given for φ(t) when t does
not denote any object in the domain, condition (i) in Definition 6 guarantees that
satisfiability of i :φ is defined over admissible assignments for i :φ. This provides
the first difference between satisfiability in DFOL and satisfiability in first-order
logic, whose consequences are highlighted in the proposition below.
Proposition 1. Let →x denote either
→j
x or
j→
x for some j 6= i, andM be a DFOL
model such that Mi contains a single first-order model m. Then the following
properties hold:
(i) if a is admissible for φ, thenM |= i :φ[a] if and only if m |= φ[ai];
(ii) if a is not admissible for i :φ, thenM 6|= i :φ[a] andM 6|= i :¬φ[a];
(iii) if ai(
→
x) is not defined, thenM 6|= i :∃y.y = →x[a];
(iv) M |= i : ∀x.φ(x)[a] does not imply thatM |= i : φ(→x)[a] for an arbitrary
arrow variable
→
x;
(v) M |= i :¬φ[a] (resp.,M |= i :ψ[a]) does not imply thatM |= i :φ ⊃ ψ[a];
(vi) M |= i :φ[a] does not imply thatM |= i :φ ∨ ψ[a];
4This, in order to not constrain the existence of pairs in the domain relation, if not required by
explicit bridge rules which we will introduce in Section 3.4.
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(vii) ifM |= i :φ ⊃ ψ[a], thenM |= i :φ[a] implies thatM |= i :ψ[a];
(viii) M |= i :φ(→x)[a] implies thatM |= i :∃x.φ(x)[a].
Property (i) shows that DFOL satisfiability and first-order logic satisfiability
coincide when Mi is a single first-order model, provided that a is admissible for
φ. Property (ii) states thatM does not satisfy any formula containing arrow vari-
ables
→
x which are not assigned by a, including formulas which have the form
of classical tautologies. Property (iii) shows that the existence of an individual
equal to
→
x is not always guaranteed in DFOL. Another important difference w.r.t.
satisfiability in first-order logic is the fact that a universally quantified variable
cannot be instantiated to an arbitrary term that contains arrow variables (prop-
erty (iv)). The term must contain arrow variables
→
x that are assigned to some
value by a. Properties (v)–(vi) state that the “introduction” of classical connec-
tives in a formula cannot be done according to the rules for propositional logic,
since extending a formula with new terms may introduce new arrow variables not
assigned by a. Finally, properties (vii) and (viii) provide examples of first-order
properties which still hold in DFOL. In particular (vii) shows that modus ponens
is a sound inference rule for satisfiability in DFOL, while property (viii) shows
that if φ holds for a certain arrow variable
→
x , then there is an object of the world
(i.e., ∃x) such that φ holds for it. All the above properties are consequences of the
fact thatM |= i : φ[a] does not only mean that all the models m in Mi satisfy φ,
but also that the arrow variables contained in φ actually denote elements in domi.
3.3.2 Satisfiability in a set of local models
Interpreting each Li into a set of models, rather than into a single model, enables
the formalisation of partial knowledge about values of terms and about truth val-
ues of formulas, as informally described at page 11. Proposition 2 describes the
main effects of partial knowledge on the notion of satisfiability in DFOL.
Proposition 2. Let t be a non-complete term and φ and ψ be non-complete for-
mulas of Li which do not contain arrow variables. There exist a DFOL modelM
and an assignment a such as:
(i) M 6|= i :x = t[a];
(ii) M |= i :φ ∨ ψ[a] but neitherM |= i :φ[a] norM |= i :ψ[a];
(iii) M |= i :∃x.φ(x)[a] but there is no d ∈ domi withM |= i :φ(x)[a(x := d)].
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Properties (i) and (ii) emphasise that the value of non-complete terms and of
disjuncts of non-complete formulas can be undetermined. An interesting instance
of property (ii) is when ψ = ¬φ. In this case neitherM |= i : φ[a] norM |= i :
¬φ[a], as in property (ii) of Proposition 1, but for a different reason: Proposition 1
states that a model M does not satisfy a formula and its negation if assignment
a is not complete for that formula. Instead, Proposition 2 states that M does
not satisfy a formula and its negation because it contains two local models, one
satisfying φ and the other satisfying ¬φ. Finally, property (iii) states that the value
of an existentially quantified variable can be unknown in a given knowledge base.
Satisfiability of complete formulas w.r.t. a set of local models shares the same
properties of satisfiability w.r.t. a single local model. This is a consequence of the
fact that complete formulas are interpreted in the same way in all the local models
in Mi. Thus, Proposition 2 does not hold for complete formulas.
Proposition 3. Let t be a complete term and φ and ψ be complete formulas of Li
which do not contain arrow variables. For all modelsM:
(i) there is an assignment a such thatM |= i :x = t[a];
(ii) for all assignments a,M |= i :φ ∨ ψ[a] iffM |= i :φ[a] orM |= i :ψ[a];
(iii) for all assignments a,M |= i : ∃xφ(x)[a] iff for some d ∈ domiM |= i :
φ(x)[a(x := d)].
3.3.3 Local inconsistency
ModelsMwhereMi = ∅ andMj 6= ∅ formalise the idea of local inconsistency of
the i-th knowledge base. That is, of a situation where one (or more) inconsistent
knowledge base can coexist with consistent ones. This basic property of local
inconsistence is formally described by the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let {Li} be a family of first-order languages. There exists a DFOL
modelM for {Li} such thatM |= i :⊥ butM 6|= j :⊥.
To prove this statement consider a trivial modelM with Mi = ∅ and Mj 6= ∅.
3.4 Denoting cross-KB constraints via bridge rules
The DFOL language described so far is able to represent the different local KBs,
but cannot be used to express formulas spanning over different knowledge bases.
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We enrich DFOL with this ability by introducing a class of “cross language formu-
las”. These formulas are an extension of the notion of bridge rule, first introduced
in [32] in a proof-theoretic setting.
Definition 7 (Bridge rule). Given i, i1, . . . , in ∈ I , a bridge rule from i1, . . . , in
to i is an expression of the form i1 :φ1, . . . , in :φn → i :φ.
A bridge rule can be seen as an axiom spanning between different logical
theories (the local knowledge bases); it restricts the set of possible DFOL models
to those in which i : φ is a logical consequence of i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn. We call
i1 :φ1, . . . , in :φn the premises of the rule and i :φ the conclusion. As an example,
the bridge rule
1: inbox(x, r)→ 2:∃y inbox(1→x , y)
represents the fact that the rightmost ball seen by Mr.1 inside the box is seen also
by Mr.2.
Definition 8 (Satisfiability of bridge rules). A model M satisfies a bridge rule
i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn → i : φ if for all the assignments a strictly admissible for
i1 :φ1, . . . , in :φn the following holds:
ifM |= i1 : φ1[a], . . . ,M |= in : φn[a] then
there is an extension a′ ≥ a, admissible for i :φ, such thatM |= i : φ[a′].
Given a set of bridge rules BR on the family of languages {Li}, a BR-model
is a DFOL model for {Li} that satisfies all the bridge rules of BR.
Definition 8 enables us to illustrate the difference between i : φ ⊃ ψ and
i :φ→ i :ψ. Let us disregard here the requirement of the existence of a′ extension
of a. M |= i : φ ⊃ ψ is satisfied if all local models mi ∈ M satisfy φ ⊃ ψ.
Instead, M |= i : φ → i : ψ is satisfied if, whenever all local models mi ∈ M
satisfy φ it is also the case that all the local models mi ∈ M satisfy ψ. This
difference is analogous to the one between (φ ⊃ ψ) and φ ⊃ ψ in modal
logic.
Bridge rules, together with arrow variables, are used to relate cross-domain
objects and knowledge. We illustrate this with the help of simple bridge rules,
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together with their intuitive reading:
i :P (
→j
x )→ j :Q(x) Every object of domj , that is a translation of
an object of domi that has property P , has
property Q.
(2)
i :P (x)→ j :Q(i→x ) Every object of domi that has property P
can be translated into an object of domj that
has property Q.
(3)
j :Q(
i→
x )→ i :P (x) Every object of domi, that is translated into
an object of domj that has property Q, has
property P .
(4)
j :Q(x)→ i :P (→jx ) Every object of domj that has property Q is
the translation of some object of domi that
has property P .
(5)
The intuitive (and formal) reading of bridge rules (2)–(5) (and of bridge rules
in general) can be expressed also in terms of query containment, given the appro-
priate transformation via domain relation. Let ||P ||i be the answer of query P (x)
to a database i, then bridge rules (2)–(5) can be read as:
rij(||P ||i) ⊆ ||Q||j ||P ||i ⊆ r−1ij (||Q||j) ||P ||i ⊇ r−1ij (||Q||j) rij(||P ||i) ⊇ ||Q||j
Definition 8 states that a bridge rule is satisfied if for all the assignments a
strictly admissible for the premises of the rule, there exists an extension a′ of a
admissible for the conclusion. This implies that arrow variables occurring in the
premise of a bridge rule are intended to be universally quantified, while arrow
variables occurring in the consequence of a bridge rule are intended to be existen-
tially quantified. In other words, if we use an arrow variable in the consequence of
a bridge rule we impose the existence of certain mappings between domains. This
happens in (3), where every element of P must have at least one translation into
Q (via rij), and in (5), where every element that is Q has at least a pre-image in
P (via rij). Conversely, if we use arrow variables in the premise of a bridge rule
we restrict the way domain relations can map elements of the different domains
without imposing the existence of certain mappings. This happens in (2), where
the elements of P are not forced to have a translation into some elements of Q,
and in (4), where the elements of Q are not forced to be the translation of some
element of P .
Definition 9 (Logical Consequence). i : φ is a logical consequence of a set of
formulas Γ w.r.t. a set of bridge rules BR, in symbols Γ |=BR i : φ, if for all
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the BR-models M and for all the assignments a, strictly admissible for Γ, the
following holds:
ifM |= Γ[a], then
there is an extension a′ ≥ a, admissible for i : φ such thatM |= i : φ[a′].
DFOL logical consequence bears similarities and differences w.r.t. logical con-
sequence for first-order logic. Focusing on the similarities, we can observe that
if we restrict to a single knowledge base i, and we consider a fixed set of arrow
variables, for which we assume the existence of an admissible assignment, then
the behaviour of logical consequence in DFOL turns out to be similar to that of
first-order logic, as shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Basic properties of logical consequence).
(i) Reflexivity: Γ, i :φ |=BR i :φ;
(ii) Weak monotonicity: if Γ |=BR i :φ, and Σ is a set of formulas whose arrow
variables either occur in Γ or do not occur in i :φ, then Γ,Σ |=BR i :φ;
(iii) Cut: if Γ |=BR i :φ and Γ, i :φ |=BR j :ψ, then Γ |=BR j :ψ;
(iv) Extension of first-order logical consequence: Let BR be an empty set of
bridge rules, and Γ be a set of i-formulas. We have that
Γ |= φ if and only if i :
n∧
k=1
(
∃yk.yk = →xk
)
, i :Γ |=BR i :φ (6)
where
→
x1, . . . ,
→
xn are the arrow variables occurring in φ but not in Γ, and
i : Γ is used to denote the set {i : φ|φ ∈ Γ}. If there are no arrow variables
occurring only in φ and not in Γ, then (6) reduces to
Γ |= φ if and only if i :Γ |=BR i :φ.
Proof. Properties (i)–(iii) are easy consequences of Definition 9. Concerning item
(iv), we prove here the simplified version Γ |= φ if and only if i : Γ |=BR i :φ. The
proof of the general case shown in Equation (6) is similar.
• The fact that Γ |= φ implies i : Γ |=BR i : φ is an easy consequence of the
fact that each Mi is a set of first-order models m for Li.
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• Assume that i :Γ |=BR i :φ. Since BR is empty, φ does not contain new arrow
variables, and since Γ is a set of i-formulas, we can rewrite Definition 9 as:
for all DFOL models M, Mi |= i : Γ[a] implies Mi |= i : φ[a]. Let m be
an arbitrary first-order model for Li. Among all the possible DFOL models
there is surely one such that Mi = {m}. Thus m |= Γ implies m |= φ and
Γ |= φ.
The key point in proving that i : Γ |=BR i : φ implies Γ |= φ is the fact
that we can consider arbitrary DFOL models, and therefore also models such that
Mi = {m}. This assumption cannot be made when BR is not empty, as we
need to restrict to specific classes of BR-models. In other words, as soon as we
consider different local knowledge bases, which interact via bridge rules, the be-
haviour of logical consequence in DFOL differs from that of logical consequence
in first-order logic, even if we restrict to “safe” sets of arrow variables or no arrow
variables at all. An important difference with first-order logic is given by the fact
that the deduction theorem does not hold in the general case:
Proposition 6. Let BR be an arbitrary set of bridge rules, and i :φ be a formula
whose arrow variables occur entirely in Γ. Γ, i : φ |=BR i : ψ does not imply
Γ |=BR i :φ ⊃ ψ.
Proof. Let us assume that Γ, i : φ |=BR i : ψ holds and let us pick a BR-model
M such that Γ |=BR i : φ ⊃ ψ does not hold. In particular let model M be a
BR-model such thatM |=BR Γ butM 6|=BR i : φ. Assume in particular that Mi
contains two local models m1 and m2 such that m1 |= φ, m2 |= ¬φ, and both m1
andm2 satisfy ¬ψ. Since BR is an arbitrary set of bridge rules we are guaranteed
that we can perform this construction. ModelM is the counterexample we need
to falsify Γ |=BR i :φ ⊃ ψ. In fact, it satisfies Γ but falsifies φ ⊃ ψ because of m1.
Note that, if i : φ is a complete formula, or the class of BR-models are such
that all m ∈ Mi satisfy φ ⊃ ψ, the counter-example shown in the proof above
cannot be built and we can prove that the deduction theorem holds (modulo arrow
variables) using property (iv) in Proposition 5. We can therefore conclude that
bridge rules, used together with assumptions which consist of partial knowledge,
are the reason of the failure of the deduction theorem in DFOL.
Another important characteristics of logical consequence in DFOL is the fact
that it preserves local inconsistency, without making it global.
Proposition 7. Let BR be an arbitrary set of bridge rules, i :⊥ 6|=BR j :⊥.
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Since BR is an arbitrary set of bridge rules, we can assume that the model used
to validate Proposition 4 is a BR-model. Thus i :⊥ 6|=BR j :⊥.
Finally, from the definition of admissible assignment, we can see that an arrow
variable
→j
x which occur in an i-formula represents the pre-image (via r−1ij ) of a
variable x in j, while an arrow variable
i→
y occurring in a formula with index j
represents an image of y in i (again via rij). This means that if y =
→j
x holds in i
then
i→
y = x holds in j. A similar property holds for rji.
Proposition 8. i :y =
→j
x |=BR j : i→y = x and j :x = i→y |=BR i :→jx = y.
Proof. LetM be an BR-model. and a be an assignment admissible for i :y = →jx
such thatM |= i :y = →jx [a]. We need to show that: (i) there exist an assignment
a′ extension of a admissible for i :
→j
x = y and (i)M |= j : i→y = x[a′].
• Existence of a′. Since M |= i : y = →jx [a], we have that ai(y) = ai(→jx ).
From the definition of assignment (item (i) in Definition 4) we know that
ai(
→j
x ) ∈ r−1ij (aj(x)), that is, rij(ai(
→j
x )) = aj(x). Let us define a′ as the
extension of a such that a′j(
i→
y ) = aj(x). Since a was strictly admissible
for i : y =
→j
x , a′j(
i→
y ) is the only new value we need to add to a to make
it admissible for i :
→j
x = y. We need to show that a′ is an assignment,
that is, it satisfies condition (ii) in Definition 4. This condition requires that
a′j(
i→
y ) ∈ rij(a′i(y)). Since we have defined a′j(
i→
y ) = aj(x) and a′i(y) =
ai(y) = ai(
→j
x ), we can rewrite condition (ii) as aj(x) ∈ rij(ai(→jx )). Since
we know (see above) that rij(ai(
→j
x )) = aj(x), a′ satisfies condition (ii) of
Definition 4.
• M |= j : i→y = x[a′]. Immediately follows from the definition of a′.
The proof of statement j :x =
i→
y |=BR i :→jx = y is analogous and is left as an
exercise.
Note that the proposition above states a logical property of arrow variables
which depends upon the semantics of arrow variables, and not upon the form
of the domain relation. Additional logical properties involving arrow variables,
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instead, hold for specific sets of domain relations. These will be illustrated in the
next section.
Finally, bridge rules enjoy the so-called directionality property. Namely they
allow to transfer knowledge from the premises to the conclusion with no back-flow
of knowledge in the opposite direction. More formally: given a set BR of bridge
rules such that k does not appear in the conclusion of a bridge rule neither as the
index of the conclusion nor as an index of an arrow variable, then Γ |=BR k : φ iff
Γk |= φ. The proof of this statement is given in Section 5 in a proof theoretical
manner (see Proposition 11).
We conclude the presentation of the semantics of DFOL by showing how we
can use it to formalise the Magic box scenario and the Mediator scenario intro-
duced in Section 2.
Example 5 (A formalisation of the magic box). We start from the languages
L1 and L2 defined in Example 3. We also require that both the observers have
complete knowledge on their views and therefore we impose that Lci = Li with
i = 1, 2. Local axioms are used to represent the facts that are true in the views
of the observers. Examples of local axioms of Mr.1 and Mr.2 follow, where
empty(p) is a shorthand for ∀x¬inbox(x, p) for a given position “p”, and l, c, r
are shorthands for “left”, “center”, and “right”, respectively.
1:∀x∀y(inbox(x, y) ⊃ y = l ∨ y = r) (7)
2:∀x∀y(inbox(x, y) ⊃ y = l ∨ y = c ∨ y = r) (8)
1:∃x(inbox(x, r) ∧ empty(l)) ∨ ∃x(inbox(x, l) ∧ empty(r))∨
∃x∃y(¬(x = y) ∧ inbox(x, l) ∧ inbox(y, r)) ∨ (empty(l) ∧ empty(r)) (9)
Axioms (7) and (8) describe that Mr.1 and Mr.2 see two and three slots, respec-
tively. Axiom (9) describes all the possible configurations of the slots of the box
as seen by Mr.1.
Bridge rules are used to formalise the relation between Mr.1’s and Mr.2’s
knowledge on their respective views. A first group of bridge rules formalises that:
(i) the rightmost ball seen by Mr.1 in the box is seen also by Mr.2, and (ii) the
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leftmost ball seen by Mr.2 in the box is seen also by Mr.1:
1: inbox(x, r)→ 2:∃y inbox(1→x , y) (10)
1: inbox(x, l) ∧ empty(r)→ 2:∃y inbox(1→x , y) (11)
2: inbox(x, l)→ 1:∃y inbox(2→x , y) (12)
2:empty(l) ∧ inbox(x, c)→ 1:∃y inbox(2→x , y) (13)
2:empty(l) ∧ empty(c) ∧ inbox(x, r)→ 1:∃y inbox(2→x , y) (14)
A second group of bridge rules formalise that the two observers agree on the
colours of the balls they both see:
i : black(
→j
x )→ j : black(x), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} (15)
i : white(
→j
x )→ j : white(x), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} (16)
The domain relations between dom1 and dom2 are used to represent the fact that
Mr.1 and Mr.2 look at the same real world objects. A consequence of this is that
the domain relations must be one the inverse of the other. This is formalised by a
bridge rule as the one below, whose meaning will be better explained in Section
4.1 and Figure 6 :
i : x =
→j
y → j : y = →ix (17)
The DFOL model defined in Example 4 satisfies all the bridge rules (10)–(17).
To show how the satisfiability of bridge rules works, let us consider bridge rule
(10). In particular, let us consider an assignment a such as ai(x) = c. In this
case,M |= 1 : inbox(x, r)[a] since 〈c, r〉 ∈ inboxI1 . We need to show that there
is an extension a′ of a, admissible for 2 : ∃y inbox(1→x , y), such as M satisfies
it. By observing the domain relation r12 we can define a′ as an extension of a
with a′j(
1→
x ) = a. It is now easy to show our claim. In fact, 〈a, l〉 ∈ inboxI2 .
Thus, the formula ∃y inbox(1→x , y) with 1→x bound to a is satisfied by m2 and, as a
consequence, byM.
Example 6 (A formalisation of the mediator). Let the languages L1, L2 and Lm
be the ones informally defined in Figure 2. We focus here on the bridge rules able
to express the relations between the sellers and the mediator, that is, the fact that
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the latter sells all and only products sold by each of the formers, whose price has
been set to a specific value.
First of all, we need to specify the shape of the domain relation, that is, indi-
cate that fruits are mapped into fruits, numbers into numbers, and so on. Let us
focus on fruits which is the peculiarity of this example. The choice made by the
mediator is to be able to represent all fruits sold by the two sellers. For the sake of
this example, we also have decided that the mediator sells apples by their specific
variety (similarly to Sel.2) and that he knows that “apples” of Sel .1 correspond
to both “Delicious” and “GrannySmith” in his own database. We express all
these choices by means of the following bridge rules:
1:x = Apple→ m : 1→x = Delicious ∨ 1→x = GrannySmith (18)
1:x = Lemon→ m : 1→x = Lemon (19)
2:x = Delicious→ m : 2→x = Delicious (20)
2:x = GrannySmith→ m : 2→x = GrannySmith (21)
2:x = Orange→ m : 2→x = Orange (22)
The mediator offers all the fruits available in Sel .1 (resp. Sel.2) whose price
has been set.
1:Available(x, y) ∧ Price(x, z)→ m :Offer(1→x , 1→y , 1→z ) (23)
2:Available(x, y, z)→ m :Offer(2→x , 2→y , k) ∧ k = 2→z ÷ 2→y (24)
The mediator sells only fruits that are available in Sel .1 or in Sel.2;
1:¬∃y.Available(→mx , y), 2:¬∃yz.Available(→mx , y, z)
→ m :¬∃y, z.Offer(x , y , z ) (25)
In database terms, the above bridge rules can be read as a query defini-
tion for the predicate Offer in the database of m5. When a user submits the
query Offer(x, y, z) to m, it rewrites this as two queries. The first one is query
Available(x, y) ∧ Price(x, z), generated by (23), and sent to Sel .1 . The sec-
ond query is Available(x, y, z), generated by (24) and sent to Sel.2. Sel .1 and
5An investigation on the usage of bridge rules for answering queries in distributed databases
can be found in [66].
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Sel.2 separately evaluate the two queries and send the result back to the media-
tor using the domain relations shaped by bridge rules (18)–(22) to appropriately
“translate” the result. This reading of bridge rules formalises the GAV (global as
view) approach to information integration described in [72]. Finally, bridge rule
(25) formalises a closure condition, that is, the fact that all the data relevant to
Offer in m are retrieved from the relations Available (and Price) of the sellers’
databases. Similar combinations of bridge rules to constrain the domain rela-
tion and the interpretation of predicates are exploited in [69] to perform instance
migration among heterogeneous ontologies by means of bridge rules between on-
tology Aboxes and ontology Tboxes.
4 How to represent distributed knowledge via bridge
rules
In this section we illustrate how to represent important types of relations between
local knowledge bases by means of bridge rules. We first investigate how to model
specific relations between different domains (Section 4.1); we then focus on the
usage of bridge rules to represent pairwise semantic mappings (Section 4.2)and
the join of knowledge from different knowledge sources (Section 4.3); finally, we
introduce and investigate the notion of entailment of bridge rules (Section 4.4).
4.1 Representing specific domain relations
The definition of domain relation as a generic relation provides DFOL with the
capability to represent arbitrary correspondences between systems that have been
designed autonomously. Nonetheless, the correlation patterns between domains
of different knowledge bases often correspond to well known properties of rela-
tions. Examples are isomorphic domains, containment between domains, injective
transformations, and so on. As already mentioned in Example 6, bridge rules can
be used to impose restrictions on the shape of the domain relation in order to cap-
ture specific correspondences. In this paper we consider the following properties
:
Fij: rij is a (partial) function. In this case, the elements in domi have at most
one corresponding element in domj . This is used, for instance, to express
the fact that domj has a smaller granularity than domi. An example of
this is the mediator example, where dom1 has a smaller granularity w.r.t.
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domm since it describes apples ignoring their different varieties. In this
case, we could safely assume that r1m satisfies the Fij property, while we
would not impose it for an hypothetical domain relation rm1.
Tij: rij is total. In this case, each element of domi has a corresponding element
in domj , and therefore the entire domi can be embedded (via rij) into
domj .
Sij: rij is surjective. In this case, each element of domj is the corresponding of
some object of domi, and the entire domj can be seen as the transformation
of some parts of domi.
Jij: rij is injective. In this case, inequality is preserved by rij .
Gij: rij is a congruence, that is, there is a K ∈ N and two families {domik}k∈K
and {domjk}k∈K of disjoint subsets of domi and domj respectively, such
that rij =
⋃
k∈K(domik × domjk). In this case we can partition both
domi and domj in K subsets such that each one of the domik is com-
pletely mapped in the corresponding domjk . In other worlds, we can find
an abstraction of both domi and domj composed of K elements such that
there is a one to one mapping between the two, or alternatively, we can
create a mediator’s domain composed exactly of K elements which can be
used to relate domi and domj .
Iij: rij is the inverse of rji; in this case the transformation from domi to domj
corresponds to the way in which domj is transformed into domi.
Eijk: rjk is the Euclidean composition of rij and rik, that is for every d in domi,
d′ in domj and d′′ in domk if d is related to d′ via rij and d is related to
d′′ via rik, then d′ is related to d′′ via rjk. Notationally, we express this
as rjk ⊆ rij oni rik. This property can be useful if we consider i to be
the knowledge base of a mediator. In this case the Euclidean composition
ensures that if d′ and d′′ are mediated into d, then there exists also a direct
transformation between them.
Cijk: rik is the composition of rij and rjk, that is rik = rij ◦ rjk. This property
guarantees that if there is a way of transforming an object d of domi into an
object d′ of domk via domj , then there is also a direct way of transforming
d into d′ using rik (and vice-versa).
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As we can see these properties can refer to a single domain relation, as in Fij–Gij ,
to two domain relations, as in the case of Iij , or to several, as in Cijk and Eijk.
The formalisation of the above properties relies on the usage of arrow vari-
ables, together with the equality predicate, to write bridge rules able to constrain
the shape of the domain relation. As an example, a modelM satisfies a formula
of the form i : x =
→j
y (resp. j :
i→
x = y) exactly when rij relates the object ai(x)
in domi to the object aj(y) in domj as in the graphical representation provided
below:
ai(x) aj(y)rij
A more complex scenario is the one in whichM satisfies the two bridge rules
i :x =
→j
y [a] and j :y =
k→
z [a]. This originates the more complex diagram:
aj(y)
ai(x) ak(z)
rij rkj
Using this graphical notation, we can represent Gij , Iij , Cijk and Eijk as in
Figure 5, where solid lines imply the existence of the dashed lines.
ai(x) aj(v)
ai(y) aj(w)
(Gij)
rij
ai(x) aj(y)
(Iij)
rij
rji
aj(y)
ai(x) ak(z)
(Cijk)
rij rjk
rik
aj(y)
ai(x)
ak(z)
(Eijk)
rij
rik
rjkrkj
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the properties of the domain relation.
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We say that a model M satisfies Fij–Cijk if the domain relations it contains
satisfy Fij–Cijk.
Proposition 9. A modelM satisfies the properties Fij–Cijk contained in the left
hand side column of Figure 6 if and only if it satisfies the corresponding bridge
rules on the right hand side column.
Property Bridge Rule
Fij : 〈z, x〉, 〈z, y〉 ∈ rij implies x = y i :→jx = →jy → j :x = y
Tij : ∀x ∈ domi∃y ∈ domj s.t. 〈x, y〉 ∈ rij i :x = x→ j :∃y y = i→x
Sij : ∀y ∈ domj∃x ∈ domi s.t. 〈x, y〉 ∈ rij j :x = x→ i :∃y y = →jx
Jij : x 6= y implies rij(x) ∩ rij(y) = ∅ i :→jx 6= →jy → j :x 6= y
Gij :
〈x, v〉
〈y, v〉
〈x,w〉
 ∈ rij implies 〈y, w〉 ∈ rij
i :x =
→j
v
i :y =
→j
v
i :x =
→j
w
→ j :
i→
y = w
Iij:
rij ⊆ r−1ji
r−1ji ⊆ rij
i :x =
→j
y → j :y = →ix
j :x =
→i
y → i :y = →jx
Eijk:
rjk ⊆ r−1ji ◦ rik
r−1ji ◦ rik ⊆ rjk
rkj ⊆ r−1ki ◦ rij
r−1ki ◦ rij ⊆ rkj
j :y =
→k
z → i :→jy = →kz
i :
→j
y =
→k
z → j :y = →kz
j :y =
k→
z → i :→jy = →kz
i :
→j
y =
→k
z → j :y = k→z
Cijk:
rij ◦ rjk ⊆ rik
rik ⊆ rij ◦ rjk
j :
i→
x =
→k
z → k : i→x = z
i :x =
→k
z → j : i→x = →kz
Figure 6: Bridge rules used to constrain domain relations.
Proof. We first show that ifM satisfies a property among Fij–Eijk, thenM sat-
isfies the corresponding bridge rule (IF direction); then we show the vice-versa
(ONLY IF direction).
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Fij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij is a function and thatM |= i : →jx =
→j
y [a]; we have to show thatM |= j :x = y[a]. FromM |= i :→jx = →jy [a]
we have that ai(
→j
x ) = ai(
→j
y ). Since rij is a function then rij(ai(
→j
x )) =
rij(ai(
→j
y )) contains at most one element. This implies that aj(x) = aj(y),
and therefore thatM |= j :x = y[a].
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= i : →jx = →jy → j : x = y and let
us prove that rij is a function. Let d ∈ domi and suppose by contradiction
that d′ 6= d′′ ∈ rij(d). Consider the assignment a with ai(→jx ) = ai(→jy ) = d
and aj(x) = d′ and aj(y) = d′′. Obviously,M |= i :→jx = →jy [a] butM 6|=
j :x = y[a], which contradicts the fact thatM |= i :→jx = →jy → j :x = y.
Thus, rij is a function.
Tij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij is a total relation and thatM |= i :x =
x[a]6 with a strictly admissible for i :x = x. We have to show that there is an
extension a′ such thatM |= j : ∃y.y = i→x [a′]. Since rij is total, rij(ai(x))
is not empty, and in particular it contains an element d′ such that we can
define an extension a′ of a with a′j(
i→
x ) = d′. Thus,M |= j :∃y.y = i→x [a′].
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= i :x = x→ j :∃y.y = i→x and let us
prove that rij is total. Let d ∈ domi, and let a be an assignment that does
not assign any arrow variable such that ai(x) = d. SinceM |= i :x = x[a]
then the bridge rule i : x = x → j : ∃y.y = i→x guarantees that a can
always be extended to an assignment a′ admissible for j : ∃y.y = i→x such
that aij(
i→
x ) = d′ for some d′ ∈ domj . Thus, d′ ∈ rij(d) and rij is total.
Sij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij is surjective and thatM |= j :x = x[a]
with a strictly admissible for j :x = x. The fact that rij is surjective implies
that there is a pre-image d ∈ domi of aj(x) such that 〈d, aj(x)〉 ∈ rij .
Thus, a can be extended to a′ with a′i(
→j
x ) = d, which is admissible for
∃y.y = →jx . Thus,M |= i :∃y.y = →jx [a′].
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= j : x = x → i : ∃y.y = →jx and let
us prove that rij is surjective. Let d be an element of domj , and a be an
6This latter assumption is always true.
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assignment with aj(x) = d. Then,M |= j : x = x[a]. From the hypothesis
a can be extended to an assignment a′ admissible for ∃y.y = →jx , that is, an
assignment a′ such that a′i(
→j
x ) = d′ and 〈d′, d〉 ∈ rij . Thus rij is surjective.
Jij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij is injective and that M |= i : →jx 6=
→j
y [a]. Since rij is injective and ai(
→j
x ) 6= ai(→jy ) we have that rij(ai(→jx )) ∩
rij(ai(
→j
y )) = ∅. The facts that aj(x) ∈ rij(ai(→jx )) and aj(y) ∈ rij(aj(→jy ))
imply aj(x) 6= aj(y), and thereforeM |= j :x 6= y[a].
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose that M |= i : →jx 6= →jy → j : x 6= y and
let us prove that rij is surjective. Let d1 6= d2 be two distinct elements
of domi and let us assume that rij is not surjective, that is, there is a d in
rij(d1)urij(d2). From this we can define an assignment a with ai(→jx ) = d1,
ai(
→j
y ) = d2, aj(x) = aj(y) = d such thatM |= i :→jx 6= →jy [a]. But from
the hypothesis we have thatM |= j :x 6= y[a], that is aj(x) 6= aj(y). This is
a contradiction and we can conclude that there is no d in rij(d1) u rij(d2).
Gij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij is a congruence and thatM, a satisfy
i : x =
→j
v , i : y =
→j
v and i : x =
→j
w . This implies that aj(v) ∈ rij(ai(x)),
aj(v) ∈ rij(ai(y)), and aj(w) ∈ rij(ai(x)). This situation corresponds to
the solid arrows in Figure 5.(Gij). From the fact that rij is a congruence we
can derive that a(w) ∈ rij(ai(y)). This implies that a can be extended to an
a′ with a′j(
i→
y ) = aj(w). ThusM |= j : i→y = w[a′].
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= i :x = →jv , i : y = →jv , i :x = →jw →
j :
i→
y = w and let us show that rij is a congruence. For every d, d′ ∈ domi
let d ∼i d′ iff rij(d) = rij(d′). Similarly for every d, d′ ∈ domj let d ∼j d′
if and only if r−1ij (d) = r
−1
ij (d). ∼i (∼j) is an equivalence relation and [d]i
([d]j) is the equivalence classes of dw.r.t,∼i (∼j). Let [d]i be an equivalence
class such that there is a d′ ∈ rij(d). From the hypothesis we have that
[d]i × [d′]j ⊆ rij . Furthermore, if [c]i 6= [d]i and c′ ∈ rij(c), d′ ∈ rij(d),
then [c′]j 6= [d′]j . This implies that rij is a congruence that can be expressed
as
rij =
⋃
d,d′∈rij
[d]i × [d]j
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Iij IF Direction. Let us assume that rij ⊆ r−ji and that M |= i : x =
→j
y [a].
From the definition of assignment we have that 〈ai(→jy ), aj(y)〉 ∈ rij . From
ai(x) = ai(
→j
y ) we obtain that 〈ai(x), aj(y)〉 ∈ rij , and from the fact that
rij ⊆ r−ji we have that 〈aj(y), ai(x)〉 ∈ rji. We can therefore extend a to an
assignment a′ with a′j(
→i
x ) = aj(y), such thatM |= j :→ix = y[a′]. A similar
proof can be shown for the case r−ji ⊆ rij and for the second bridge rule of
property Iij in Proposition 9.
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= i :x = →jy → j : y = →ix and let us
show that rij ⊆ r−ji. Let d, d′ be two elements such that d′ ∈ rij(d) and such
that there is an assignment a with d = ai(x) and aj(y) = d′. It is easy to
see thatM |= i :x = →jy [a] holds. From the hypothesis we know that a can
be extended to an assignment a′ such thatM |= j :→ix = y[a′]. This implies
that a′j(
→i
x ) = d′. From the definition of extension a′i(x) = ai(x) = d, and
therefore d ∈ rji(a′j(
→i
x )), that is d ∈ rji(d′). A similar proof can be done
for the second bride rule of property Iij .
Cijk IF Direction. Let us assume that rij◦rjk ⊆ rik and thatM |= j : i→x = →kz [a].
If we assume that y is a new variable such that
i→
x =
→k
z = y holds it is easy
to see that the domain relations comply with the solid arrows in Figure
5.(Cijk). Since rij ◦ rjk ⊆ rik, then 〈ai(x), ak(z)〉 ∈ rik as indicated by the
dashed arrow in Figure 5.(Cijk). This means that a can be extended to an
assignment a′ with a′k(
i→
x ) = ak(z). This implies thatM |= i : i→x = z[a′].
The proof for the case rik ⊆ rij ◦ rjk is analogous.
ONLY IF Direction. Suppose thatM |= j : i→x = →kz → k : i→x = z and let
us show that rij ◦ rjk ⊆ rik, that is given an element d′ in rjk(rij(d)) we
have that d′ belongs to rik(d). By definition, d′ ∈ rjk(rij(d)) iff there is a
d′′ ∈ domj such that d′ ∈ rjk(d′′) and d′′ ∈ rij(d). Let a be an assignment
with ai(x) = ai(
→j
y ) = d, aj(y) = aj(
→k
z ) = d′′ and ak(z) = d′. This
assignment is such thatM |= i : i→x = →kz [a]. From the hypothesis, a can be
extended to an assignment a′ such thatM |= j : i→x = z[a′]. This means that
d′ = ak(z) = a′k(z) = a
′
k(
i→
x ) ∈ rik(d) and this ends the proof. The proof
for the case rik ⊆ rij ◦ rjk is analogous.
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Eijk The proof is similar to the one for Cijk.
From now on we use a label, say Fij to refer to both the property of the domain
relation and the corresponding bridge rule(s). The context will always make clear
what we mean.
4.2 Representing semantic mappings
Bridge rules can be used to formalise the important notion of semantic mapping
between knowledge bases. Semantic mappings typically involves two knowledge
bases only. In this Section we therefore restrict to pairwise bridge rules.
Definition 10 (Pairwise bridge rule). A pairwise bridge rule from i to j, or simply
a bridge rule from i to j, is a bridge rule of the form:
i :φ(x1, . . . xn,
→j
y1 , . . . ,
→j
ym )→ j :ψ(i→x1, . . . i→xn, y1, . . . , ym) (26)
Pairwise bridge rules can be used to model different forms of mappings be-
tween knowledge sources. A proof of that is the fact that almost all the encod-
ings of different formalisms into DFOL shown in Section 6 make use of pairwise
bridge rules. A typical example of pairwise bridge rules are ontology mappings.
Ontology mapping languages such as Distributed Description Logics (DDL) [65],
-connections [44, 19], and Package-based Description Logics (P-DL) [1] enable
the representation of mappings between pairs of ontologies which can be encoded
in DFOL as shown in section 6 using and extending the work in [68]7. To briefly
illustrate how pairwise bridge rules capture ontology mappings let us consider
DDL into and onto mappings:
i :C
v−→ j :D i :C w−→ j :D
used to express that concept C in ontology Oi is mapped into (onto) concept D in
ontology Oj . As shown in [68], these expressions can be represented by means
of pairwise mappings of the form
i :C(
→j
x )→ j :D(x) j :D(x)→ i :C(j→x ).
7For a survey on the usage of semantic mappings as a way of matching heterogeneous ontolo-
gies see [21].
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Another typical example of pairwise mappings are mappings occurring in
database integration. Here, the work in [13, 23] introduces peer-to-peer map-
pings as expressions of the form cq1  cq2 where cq1 and cq2 are conjunctive
queries in two distinct knowledge bases. The intuitive meaning of cq1  cq2, is
that the answer of the query cq1 to the knowledge base KB1 must be contained
in the answer of cq2 submitted to KB2. We can easily observe that this is simi-
lar to the intuitive reading of bridge rules (2)–(5) in terms of query containment
provided at page 18. Other examples of pairwise expressions used to semantically
map two databases can be found in [14, 15, 47, 72, 36, 35]. Finally, the concept
of infomorphism defined by Barwise and Seligman in [2] can be formalised via a
set of pairwise bridge rules and one domain relation. Again an encoding of some
of these approaches in DFOL is contained in Section 6.
A final instance of DFOL pairwise bridge rule is j : ⊥ → i : ⊥. This rule,
called inconsistency propagation rule and denoted with IPji, forces inconsistency
to propagate from a source knowledge base j to a target knowledge base i. This
rule can be used to enforce the propagation of local inconsistency when needed,
since in DFOL j :⊥ does not necessarily propagate inconsistency to other knowl-
edge bases (see Proposition 7).
4.3 Joining knowledge through mappings
While pairwise bridge rules focus on “point-to-point” mappings between two
knowledge sources, DFOL bridge rules enable to encode also more complex rela-
tions involving an arbitrary number of knowledge bases.
Bridge rules can be used to express the fact that a certain combination of
knowledge coming from i1,. . . , in source knowledge bases entails some other
knowledge in a target knowledge base i. As an example, bridge rule
1:P (
→3
x ,
→3
y ), 2:Q(
→3
y ,
→3
z )→ 3:R(x, y, z) (27)
whose graphical representation is provided in Figure 7, can be read as a mapping
from the join between relation P (x, y) in 1 and Q(y, z) in 2, into R(x, y, z) in 3.
Indeed bridge rule (27) is satisfied if r13(||P ||1) ./ r23(||Q||2) ⊆ ||R||3.
4.4 Entailing bridge rules
A logic based formalisation of the notion of mapping provides the basis to in-
troduce the notion of entailment (logical consequence) between mappings. En-
tailment between mappings is important as it enables to prove that a mapping
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Figure 7: Joining distributed tables.
is redundant (as it can be derived from others), or that a set of mappings is in-
consistent. Thus, it enables to compute sets of minimal mappings between e.g.,
ontologies and it can provide the basis for mapping debugging / repair, as shown
for instance, in the work of Meilicke et al. [57] and the one of Wang and Xu [73].
DFOL provides a precise characterisation of when bridge rules are entailed
by others. For instance, to say that the bridge rule 1 : A → 3 : C is a logical
consequence of 1 : A → 2 : B and 2 : B → 3 : C. In this section we provide
a precise definition of entailment between bridge rules and we study the general
properties of such an entailment.
Definition 11 (Entailment of bridge rules). i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn → i : φ is entailed
by a set of bridge rules BR, in symbols BR |= i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn → i : φ, if
i1 :φ1 . . . in :φn |=BR i :φ.
The following proposition illustrates the effects on bridge rule entailment of
the main operations we can perform on mappings, that is: conjunction, disjunc-
tion, existential / universal restriction, composition, instantiation and inversion of
mappings.
Proposition 10. The following entailments of bridge rules hold:
Conjunction
1. i :φ→ j :ψ, i :φ′ → j :ψ′ |= i :φ ∧ φ′ → j :ψ ∧ ψ′ if φ and φ′ do not
have arrow variables in common.
2. If Fij holds, then i :φ→ j :ψ, i :φ′ → j :ψ′ |= i :φ ∧ φ′ → j :ψ ∧ ψ′
Disjunction
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1. i : φ1(x) → j :ψ1(i→x ), i : φ2(x) → j :ψ2(i→x ) |= i : φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x) →
j :ψ1(
i→
x )∨ψ2(i→x ), if at least one among φ1(x) or φ2(x) is a complete
formula.
Existential and universal quantification
1. i : φ(x) → j : ψ(i→x ) |= i : ∃xφ(x) → j : ∃xψ(x) if φ is a complete
formula.
2. If Sij holds, then i :φ(
→j
x )→ j :ψ(x) |= i :∀xφ(x)→ j :∀xψ(x)
Composition If Cijk holds, then:
1. i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x ), j :ψ(x)→ k :θ(j→x ) |= i :φ(x)→ k :θ(i→x )
2. i :φ(
→j
x )→ j :ψ(x), j :ψ(→kx )→ k :θ(x) |= i :φ(→kx )→ k :θ(x)
Instantiation
1. i :x = t→ j : i→x = s, i :φ(→jx )→ j :ψ(x) |= i :φ(t)→ j :ψ(s), with t
complete ground term of Li.
Inversion If Fij and Iji hold:
1. i : φ(x) → j :ψ(i→x ) |= j :¬ψ(i→x ) → i :¬φ(x), if φ(x) is a complete
formula.
Proof.
• Conjunction. Suppose thatM |= i : φ ∧ φ′[a], SinceM |= i : φ → j : ψ
and i : φ′ → j : ψ′, then a can be extended to a′ and a′′ admissible for j : ψ
and j : ψ′ respectively, and such that m |= ψ[a′] and m |= ψ′[a′′] for all
m ∈ Mj . If either (case 1) the arrow variables of ψ and ψ′ are disjoint, or
(case 2) rij is functional, then a′ ∪ a′′ is an extension of a, admissible for
ψ ∧ ψ′ and such that m |= ψ ∧ ψ′[a′ ∪ a′′].
• Disjunction. We prove the case of φ1(x) complete formula, the other case
is specular. Suppose thatM |= i :φ1(x)∨φ2(x)[a]. Since φ1(x) is complete
then either M |= i : φ1(x)[a] or M |= i : ¬φ(x)[a]. In the first case
since M |= i : φ1(x) → j : ψ1(i→x ), a can be extended to a′ such that
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M |= j : ψ1(i→x )[a′] and therefore M |= j : ψ1(i→x ) ∨ ψ2(i→x )[a′]. In the
second case,M |= i : φ2(x)[a], and since,M |= i : φ2(x) → j :ψ2(i→x ), a
can be extended to a′ such thatM |= j :ψ1(i→x ) ∨ ψ2(i→x )[a′].
• Composition.
1. M |= i :φ(x)[a] implies that a can be extended to a′ such thatM |=
j :ψ(
i→
x )[a′]. Since
i→
x is the only free variable of j :ψ(
i→
x ), then a′ is
also strictly admissible. Let a′′ be obtained from a′ by setting a′′j (x) =
a′j(
i→
x ) and a′′i (x) as undefined. a
′′ is strictly admissible for j :ψ(x) and
therefore it can be extended to a′′′, such thatM |= k :θ(j→x )[a′′′]. Let a∗
be the assignment obtained by extending a with a∗k(
i→
x ) = a′′′k (
j→
x ). The
fact that rik = rij ◦ rjk implies that ai(x) ∈ rik(a∗(i→x )). Furthermore,
M |= k :θ(j→x )[a′] implies thatM |= k :θ(j→x )[a∗].
2. M |= φ(→kx )[a], implies that ai is defined on→kx and that (ai(→kx ), ak(x)) ∈
rik. By condition Cijk there is a d ∈ domj such that (a(→kx ), d) ∈ rij
and (d, ak(x)) ∈ rjk. Let us assume, without loss of generality that
aj(x) = d. Let a′ be an extension of a with a′i(
→j
x ) = ai(
→k
x ) and
aj(x) = d = a
′
j(
→k
x ). The fact that Mi |= φ(→kx )[a] implies that
Mi |= φ(→jx )[a′]. The fact that M |= i : φ(→jx ) → j : ψ(x) im-
plies that Mj |= ψ(x)[a′], and since a′j(x) = a′j(
→k
x ) we have that
Mj |= ψ(→kx )[a′]. The fact thatM |= j : ψ(→kx ) → k : θ(x) implies
that Mk |= θ(x)[a′], which, in turn means that Mk |= θ(x)[a].
• Existential and universal quantification.
1. Suppose that M |= i : ∃xφ(x), then since φ is complete, there is an
assignment a, defined only on ai(x) such thatM |= i : φ(x)[a]. This
implies that a can be extended to a′, such thatM |= j :ψ(i→x )[a′]. This
trivially implies thatM |= j :∃xψ(x).
2. Let d ∈ domj . The fact that rij is surjective implies that there is a
d′ ∈ domi with 〈d, d′〉 ∈ rij . Let a be an assignment with ai(→jx ) = d′
and aj(x) = d. This assignment is admissible for i : φ(
→j
x ). The
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fact that M |= i : ∀xφ(x), implies that M |= i : φ(→jx )[a]. The fact
that M satisfies that bridge rule i : φ(→jx ) → j : ψ(x) implies that
for all m ∈ Mj , m |= ψ(x)[a]. We can therefore conclude that each
m |= ∀xψ(x).
• Instantiation. If M |= i : φ(t) (no assignment is necessary as φ(t) does
not contain any free variable) if M |= i : φ(x)[a] where ai(x) is equal to
the interpretation of t in all the models of Si. Such a unique value exists
since t is a complete term. Furthermore M |= i : x = t[a]. From the
fact that M |= i : x = t → j : i→x = s, a can be extended to a′, where
a′j(x) is equal to the interpretation of s in all the local models of Si. Let
a′′ be the assignment that assigns a′′i (
→j
x ) = ai(x) and a′′j (x) = a
′
j(
i→
x ). a′′
is strictly admissible for i : φ(
→j
x ), and M |= i : φ(→jx )[a′′]. The fact that
M |= i :φ(→jx ) → j :ψ(x), implies thatM |= j :ψ(x)[a′′] and since a′′j (x)
is equal to the interpretation of s in all the local models of Si,M |= j :ψ(s).
• Inversion. IfM |= j : ¬ψ(i→x )[a], then either Si = ∅ andM |= j :⊥, or
M 6|= j :ψ(i→x )[a]. In the first case, sinceM |= j :⊥ → i :⊥, we have that
M |= i :⊥ which implies thatM |= i : φ(x)[a]. In the second case, let us
suppose by contradiction thatM 6|= i :¬φ(x)[a]. Since φ(x) is a complete
formulaM |= i :φ(x)[a]. This means thatM |= i :φ(x)[a′]. where a′ is the
restriction of a to the value of ai(x). SinceM |= i :φ(x)→ i :ψ(i→x ), there
is an extension a′′ to a′, such thatM |= i :ψ(i→x )[a′′], The fact that rij is a
function implies that aj(
i→
x ) = a′′j (
i→
x ). This implies thatM |= j :ψ(i→x )[a],
which contradict the initial hypothesis.
To show the usefulness of bridge rules entailment consider a simple scenario
composed of three ontologiesO1, O2, andO3, pairwise connected by means of the
following DDL mappings:
1:AcademicPaper
v−→ 2:AcademicPaper (28)
2:Document
v−→ 3:Document (29)
and whereO2 contains the following terminological axiom 2:AcademicPaper v
2 :Document. If we translate the DDL formulas into corresponding DFOL state-
37
ments as follows:
1:AcademicPaper(
→2
x )→ 2:AcademicPaper(x) (30)
2:Document(
→3
x )
v−→ 3:Document(x) (31)
2:∀x.AcademicPaper(x) ⊃ Document(x) (32)
and we impose C123 between the three ontologies we can use a slight modification
of the proof of Composition above (item 2) to show that 1:AcademicPaper(→3x )→
3 : Document(x) holds. This, in turn, can be translated into the DDL mapping
1 : AcademicPaper
v−→ 3 : Document. We have intentionally chosen a sim-
ple scenario. Nonetheless, being able to compute this inferred mapping may
be crucial in the presence of a rich network of mappings containing also asser-
tions 1 : AcademicPaper v−→ 3 : RethoricalWriting and 3 : Document v
¬RethoricalWriting. In that case mapping entailment would enable us to spot
an inconsistent set of mappings, paving the way to techniques of mapping debug-
ging / repair [57, 73].
5 Logical reasoning for the bridge rules
In this section we define a Natural Deduction (ND) Calculus for DFOL: given
a set of bridge rules BR we define a calculus ML(BR) which is strongly sound
and complete with respect to the notion |=BR of logical consequence w.r.t. BR.
The calculus provides a proof-theoretic counterpart of the notion of entailment
between bridge rules introduced in Section 4.4, and can be therefore used to sup-
port formal reasoning in DFOL. By applying a finite set of inference rules, one
can prove, for instance, that a set of bridge rules is consistent, or that a bridge
rule is redundant being derivable from others, or that two sets of bridge rules are
equivalent, and so on.
We follow the approach of Multi Language Systems (ML systems) [32, 67]
and see a deduction in DFOL as composed of a set of local deductions, which
represent reasoning in a single theory, glued together by the applications of bridge
rules, which enable the transfer of truth from a local knowledge base to another.
For instance, the bridge rule i :φ(x)→ i :ψ(i→x ) can be read as
“if a certain object x has the property φ in i, then, it has a translation
i→
x in j which has the property ψ”.
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5.1 A Multi Language System for DFOL
A ML system is a triple 〈{Li}, {Ωi},∆〉where {Li} is a family of languages, {Ωi}
is a family of sets of axioms, and ∆ is a set of inference rules. ∆ contains two
kinds of inference rules: rules with premises and conclusions in the same lan-
guage, and rules with premises and conclusions belonging to different languages.
Derivability in a ML system is a generalisation of derivability in a Natural
Deduction system.
In adapting the original definition of ML system given in [32, 67] to the case
of DFOL we require each Li to be a first-order language with equality. This can be
axiomatised by setting Ωi as the set of classical Natural Deduction axioms given
in [59], and the rules in ∆ that take care of connectives, quantifiers, and equality to
mimic the inference rules given in [59]. As we will see, we have to slightly modify
the applicability conditions of these rules in order to deal with arrow variables in
a proper manner. Moreover, ∆ has to contain the Natural Deduction version of
the DFOL bridge rules introduced in Definition 7, and of the logical properties of
arrow variables stated in Proposition 8.
Notationally, we use φtx to indicate the result of replacing t for all the free oc-
currences of x in φ, provided that x does not occur free in the scope of a quantifier
of some variable of t.
Definition 12. The ML system ML(BR) for a DFOL with languages {Li} and
bridge rules BR is the triple 〈{Li}, {Ωi},∆〉, where Ωi is empty and ∆ contains
the following inference rules:
[i :φ]....
i :ψ
i :φ ⊃ ψ ⊃ Ii
i :φ i :φ ⊃ ψ
i :ψ
⊃ Ei i :φ i :ψi :φ ∧ ψ ∧Ii
i :φ ∧ ψ
i :φ
i :φ ∧ ψ
i :ψ
∧Ei
i :φ
i :φ ∨ ψ
i :φ
i :ψ ∨ φ ∨Ii
j :φ ∨ ψ
[j :φ]....
i :θ
[j :ψ]....
i :θ
i :θ
∨Eji
[i :φ]....
i :⊥
i :¬φ ⊥i
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i :φ
i :∀xφ ∀Ii
i :∀xφ
i :φtx
∀Ei i :φ
t
x
i :∃xφ ∃Ii
j :∃xφ
[j :φ]....
i :ψ
i :ψ
∃Eji
i :φ1, . . . i :φn
i : t = t
=Ii
i :φtx i : t = u
i :φux
=Ei
j :φ
[j :φ]....
i :ψ
i :ψ
Cutji
i-rules: rules for connectives, quantifiers, equality, and Cut.
i : x =
→j
y
j :
i→
x = y
i→Iij
i : x =
j→
y
j :
→i
x = y
→iIij
i1 :φ1 . . . in :φn
i : φ
BR for each i1 :φ1, . . . , in :φn → i :φ in BR
b-rules: rules for arrow variables and bridge rules.
A formula tree in ML(BR) is a tree Π which is constructed starting from a
set of assumptions and axioms by applying the i-rules and b-rules given above.
The occurrence of an arrow variable in a node i : φ of a formula tree Π is called
existential if this arrow variable does not occur in the assumptions from which
i : φ depends on. Given a formula tree Π with root i : φ, an assumption j : ψ
is called local assumption if i = j and the branch from i : φ to j : ψ contains
only applications of i-rules. An assumption is global if it is not local. A set
of assumptions is local iff all the assumptions it contains are local. It is global
otherwise. The distinction between local and global assumptions is necessary to
correctly characterise the notion |=BR of DFOL logical consequence where, as
we have seen in Proposition 6, the deduction theorem only holds with complete
formulas or local assumptions. This distinction will become clearer in discussing
restriction R3 introduced in the next definition. We only remark here that an
application of a b-rule makes all the assumptions become global, and this reflects
the fact that the satisfiability of bridge rules is defined over sets of local models,
instead of a single model.
Definition 13 (Derivability). i : φ is derivable in ML(BR) from a set of global
assumptions Γ and a set of local assumptions Σ, in symbols (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ, if
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there is a formula tree Π with root i : φ, global assumptions Γ and local assump-
tions Σ such that the following restrictions on the application of the rules in ∆ are
satisfied:
R1. The only rules whose premises can contain existential variables are Cutji,
∨Eji, and ∃Eji.
R2. The only rules that can introduce new existential variables are →iIij , i→Iij
and BR. In addition, the arrow variables contained in the conclusions of
→iIij and i→Iij must be existential.
R3. The application of ⊃ Ii,⊥i,∃Eji,Cutji can discharge only assumptions that
are either local or complete formulas. The application of ∨Eji can discharge
only assumptions that are either local or such that at least one is a complete
formula.
R4. Cutji and ∃Eji can be applied only if the existential variables in j :φ do not
occur in any other assumption employed in the derivation of i :ψ. ∨Eji can
be applied only if the existential variables in j : φ ∨ ψ do not occur in any
other assumption employed in the derivation of i :θ.
R5. ∀Ii can be applied only if x does not occur free in any assumption with index
i, and
→i
x and
i→
x do not appear in any assumption with index j 6= i.
R6. ∃Eji can be applied only if x does not occur free in any assumption with index
j different from j : φ. Moreover, if j = i then x cannot occur free in i : ψ,
otherwise if j 6= i, then j→x and →jx cannot occur in i :ψ or in any assumption
employed to derive it.
i-rules ⊃ Ii–∃Eji provide the DFOL version of Natural Deduction rules for
logical connectives and quantifiers, respectively, while i-rules = Ii and = Ei are
the DFOL version of Natural Deduction rules for the equality predicate. If we
ignore the label of the formulae and restrictions R1–R6 (which will be illustrated
in detail later), the shape of the inference rules for connectives, quantifiers, and
equality is the same as the ones of first-order logic with equality. Rules i→Iij
and →iIij are the proof theoretical counterpart of Property 8. In particular, i→Iij
states that x and y belong to the domain relation rij , while →iIij states that x and
y belong to the domain relation rji. Rule BR provides an axiomatisation of the
propagation of knowledge enforced by bridge rule i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn → i : φ.
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Finally, Cutji,∨Eji, and ∃Eji together with restrictions R1 and R4 regulate the
usage of arrow variables within deduction trees and will be illustrated further in
the remaining of the section.
Restrictions R1–R6 are used to model the behaviour of local assumptions,
global assumptions, and arrow variables. While restrictions R5 and R6 extend
the restrictions of the FOL Natural Deduction rules ∀Ii and ∃Eji to take into ac-
count the occurrence of arrow variables, restrictions R1–R4 are proper to DFOL
and deserve some explanation. Restriction R1 states that we cannot freely make
inferences from inferred facts that contain existential arrow variables. In fact, ex-
istential arrow variables have, as their name suggest, an existential meaning. As a
consequence, the same existential arrow variable occurring in, say, two different
inferred formulae is not guaranteed to denote the same element of the domain in
the proof. Therefore a way to control their usage in the proof tree is needed. To
further clarify this point consider the following proof:
Γ1....
i :ψ1(
j→
x )
Γ2....
i :ψ2(
j→
x )
i :ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x )
∧Ii
(33)
where the application of ∧Ii violates R1. In this case the application of ∧Ii allows
to infer Γ1,Γ2 `BR i :ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x ) from Γ1 `BR i :ψ1(j→x ) and Γ2 `BR i :ψ2(j→x ).
This inference is unsound. In fact, Γ1 |=BR i : ψ1(j→x ) and Γ2 |=BR i : ψ2(j→x )
guarantee that ifM satisfies both Γ1[a] and Γ2[a], then there are two extensions
a′ and a′′ of a, admissible for i : ψ1(
j→
x ) and i : ψ2(
j→
x ) respectively, such that
M satisfies both i : ψ1(j→x )[a′] and i : ψ2(j→x )[a′′]. This unfortunately does not
guarantee the existence of an extension a of a admissible for i :ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x ) such
that M |= i : ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x )[a]. In fact, assume that a′(j→x ) = d′, a′(j→x ) = d′′,
with d′ 6= d′′ where d′ is the only element of domi in the interpretation of φ1 and
d′′ is the only element of domi in the interpretation of φ2. It is easy to see that
for such a model Γ1 |=BR i : ψ1(j→x ) and Γ2 |=BR i : ψ2(j→x ), but Γ1,Γ2 6|=BR i :
ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x ). To avoid unsound inferences of this kind we provide the ability to
infer from formulas containing arrow existential variables using only rules which:
(i) combine different proof trees, and (ii) infer one of the premises of the rule,
possibly discharging assumptions, as in the case of ∨Eji, ∃Eji and Cutji.
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Cutji is the rule that takes mostly care of existential arrow variables in proofs.
The idea here is that if we have an inference Π of k :α from Γ which makes use
of an inference rule whose premises contain i : φ(
→
x), with
→
x existential arrow
variable, then we can split this inference in two parts Π1,Π2 and then “glue” them
with an application of Cut as depicted below:
Restriction R4 ensures that we can perform this “gluing” only for sound deduc-
tions. For instance, we can use the Cut rule to enable a sound application of ∧Ii
as in the following proof tree
Γ1....
i :ψ1(
j→
x1)
Γ2....
i :ψ2(
j→
x2)
[i :ψ1(
j→
x1)] [i :ψ2(
j→
x2)]
i :ψ1(
j→
x1) ∧ ψ2(j→x2)
∧Ii
i :ψ1(
j→
x1) ∧ ψ2(j→x2)
Cutii
i :ψ1(
j→
x1) ∧ ψ2(j→x2)
Cutii
(34)
while we cannot use the Cut rule to enable an unsound application of ∧Ii to obtain
i : ψ1 ∧ ψ2(j→x ) from i : ψ1(j→x ) and i : ψ2(j→x ) as in proof (33). The key point
in proof (34) is obviously the occurrence of two distinct arrow variables
j→
x1 ,
j→
x2 ,
which rules out the scenario described in explaining proof (33).
Restriction R2 regulates (prevents) the introduction of new existential vari-
ables in the proof. In fact, we must avoid the introduction of terms (existential
variables, in this case) which may not denote any element. Consider, for instance,
the following unrestricted application of ∨Ii
i :φ
i :φ ∨ ψ(→jx )
∨Ii
with
→j
x new existential variable. This inference is unsound. In fact, given an
assignment a for i : φ, we cannot guarantee the existence of an extension a′ ad-
missible for
→j
x in i (a trivial counter-model is the one with rij = ∅). However,
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if i :φ depends upon an assumption i : γ(
→j
x ), then the application of ∨Ii satisfies
restriction R2 (as
→j
x is not existential anymore) and the inference of i :φ ∨ ψ(→jx )
from i :φ is sound. In this case, assumption i :γ(
→j
x ) forces a to be already admis-
sible for
→j
x removing the obstacle shown above. Definition 8 and Proposition 8
instead ensure that →iIij , i→Iij and BR can safely introduce new existential arrow
variables.
Restriction R3 reflects the fact that |=BR is defined over sets of local models,
rather than a single model, and that this can cause the failure of the deduction
theorem, as seen in Proposition 6. Thus, to ensure soundness of the inference
rules we have to force global assumptions to be complete (in ∨Eji at least one of
the disjuncts to be complete). If proofs consist only of local assumptions, then
the requirement of being a complete formula can be dropped. In this case, in
fact, |=BR reduces to first-order logical consequence (modulo arrow variables) as
illustrated by property (iv) in Proposition 5.
We conclude the formal presentation of the DFOL calculus by proving that
bridge rules are directional:
Proposition 11 (Directionality). Given a set BR of bridge rules such that k does
not appear in the conclusion of a rule neither as the index of the conclusion nor
as an index of an arrow variable, then Γ `BR k : φ iff Γk ` φ
The proof easily follows from the observation that the ML system ML(BR)
does not contain any deduction rule which enables to infer a formula in k (apart
from local inference rules) unless k appears in the conclusion of a bridge rule as
the index or as an index of an arrow variable. By showing that the DFOL calculus
is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the notion of logical consequence of
DFOL (Section 5.2) we can transfer the result of Proposition 11 to easily show
that, for the specific set BR of Proposition 11, Γ |=BR k : φ iff Γk |= φ.
We illustrate now the usage of the calculus by applying it to the Magic box
scenario. For the sake of presentation we present the proof using a linear notation
(similar to the Lemmon-style for ND [46]) rather than a tree-based one. In this no-
tation, each line of the deduction (the deduction step) contains a label, the inferred
formula, the set of assumptions from which the inferred formula depends upon,
and the inference rule used in the deduction step. Additional examples of proofs,
which show how the calculus can be used to infer the statements corresponding to
the entailed bridge rules of Proposition 10 can be found in Appendix A.
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Example 7. Let us consider the formalisation of the magic box presented in Ex-
ample 5. Figure 8 shows a proof where we use the b-rules derived from bridge
rules (10) and (11) to prove that if Mr.1 sees a ball in the box, then Mr.2 sees a
ball in the box too, that is,:
1:∃x∃y inbox(x, y) ` 2:∃x∃y inbox(x, y)
Notationally, we use BR(n) to denote the b-rule corresponding to the bridge rule
in Equation (n). We also abbreviate “left” to “l” and “right” to “r”.
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) 1 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (1) Assumption
(2) 1 : ∃x(inbox(x, r)∨
(inbox(x, l)∧empty(r)))
(1) From (1) and local axioms using
local rules in 1
(3) 1 : inbox(x, r)∨
(inbox(x, l) ∧ empty(r))
(3) Assumption
(4) 1 : inbox(x, r) (4) Assumption
(5) 2 :∃y inbox(1→x , y) (4) From (3) by BR(10)
(6) 2 :∃y inbox(1→x , y) (6) Assumption
(7) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (6) From (6) by ∃I2
(8) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (4) From (5) and (7) by Cut12
(9) 1 : inbox(x, l) ∧ empty(r) (9) Assumption
(10) 2 :∃y.inbox(1→x , y) (9) From (9) by BR(11)
(11) 2 :∃y inbox(1→x , y) (11) Assumption
(12) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (11) From (11) by ∃I2
(13) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (9) From (9) and (11) by Cut12
(14) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (3) From (3), (8), and (13) by ∨E12
discharging (4) and (9)
(15) 2 :∃x∃y inbox(x, y) (1) From (2) and (14) by ∃E12 dis-
charging (3)
Figure 8: A derivation of 2:∃x∃y inbox(x, y) from 1:∃x∃y inbox(x, y).
The deduction starts from the assumption that, according to Mr.1, there is a
ball in the box (assumption (1)). From this fact, we can use local axioms and
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inference rules in the knowledge base of Mr.1 to prove that the ball is in the right
hand side slot or it is in the left hand side slot and the right hand side one is
empty (these steps are omitted for the sake of presentation as our focus is on the
usage of b-rules). We now reason by cases, considering first the case in which
the ball is on the right hand side (step 4) and then the case in which the ball is
in the left hand side slot and the right hand side is empty (step 9). In both cases
we can infer that Mr.2 also sees a ball (steps (8) and (12), respectively). This is
done by using the b-rules BR(10) and BR(11), and by using the Cut rule to handle
the existential arrow variables introduced by BR(10) and BR(11). We can therefore
use the “or elimination” rule to infer that Mr.2 also sees a ball directly from the
original “or” formula assumed in step (3), and then from assumption (1) by an
application of an “exist elimination” rule.
Example 8. In Figure 9 we show a proof of j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) from i : φ ∧ φ′(x),
using the bridge rules
i :
→j
x =
→j
y → j :x = y (Fij)
i : φ(x)→ j : ψ(i→x ) (35)
i : φ′(x)→ j : ψ′(i→x ) (36)
Note that this proof constitutes an example of how the calculus can be used to infer
statements corresponding to the entailed bridge rules of Proposition 10, where the
the current example corresponds to the case of Conjunction. All the remaining
cases of Proposition 10 are shown in A.
Notice that, in the deduction shown in Figure 9 we need to rename the variable
x with a fresh variable z in step (5) in order to be able to correctly apply the cut
rule (see Restriction 4) to infer j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) and to avoid problems as the
ones illustrated with the unsound application of the ∧Ii rule in Equation (33).
The b-rule BRFij , which correspond to functional domain relations, is then used
to infer j :
j→
x =
j→
z (step (18)) and this enables the replacement of
i→
z with
i→
x in
j : ψ′ in order to obtain the desired formula.
5.2 Soundness and Completeness
The goal of this section is to show that the calculus defined in Section 5 for a
given set BR of bridge rules is sound and complete with respect to the class of
BR-models defined in Section 3.3. In B we prove the Soundness Theorem and in
46
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) ∧ φ′(x) (1) Assumption
(2) i : φ(x) (1) From (1) by ∧Ei
(3) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (2) by BR(35)
(4) i : φ′(x) (1) From (1) by ∧Ei
(5) i : x = z (5) Assumption
(6) i : φ′(z) (1)(5) From (4), (5) by =Ei
(7) j : ψ′(
i→
z ) (1)(5) From (6) by BR(36)
(8) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (8) Assumption
(9) j : ψ′(
i→
z ) (9) Assumption
(10) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (8)(9) From (8) and (9) by ∧Ij
(11) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (9) (1) From (3) and (10) by Cutji dis-
charging (8)
(12) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (1) From (7) and (11) by Cutji dis-
charging (9)
(13) j :
i→
x = y (13) Assumption
(14) i : x =
→j
y (13) From (13) by →jIji
(15) j :
i→
z = w (15) Assumption
(16) i : z =
→j
w (15) From (15) by →jIji
(17) i :
→i
y =
→i
w (5) (13)(15) from (5), (14) and (16) by =Ei and
applications of Cut to handle exis-
tential arrow variables
(18) j : y = w (5)(13)(15) From (17) by BRFij
(19) j :
i→
x =
i→
z (5)(13)(15) From (13), (15) and (19) by =Ej
(20) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5)(13)(15) From (12) and (19) by =Ej
(21) j :
i→
x =
i→
x (1) From (3) by =Ij
(22) j : ∃y i→x = y (1) From (21) by ∃Ij
(23) j :
i→
z =
i→
z (1)(5) From (7) by =Ij
(24) j : ∃w i→z = w (1) From (23) by ∃Ij
(25) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5)(15) From (20) and (21) by ∃Ej dis-
charging (13)
(26) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5) From (24) and (25) by ∃Ej dis-
charging (15)
(27) i : z = z By =Ii
(28) i : ∃x x = z From (27) by ∃Ii
(29) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1) From (26) and (27) by ∃Eji dis-
charging (5)
Figure 9: An articulated DFOL derivation.
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C the Completeness Theorem. The main body of C concentrates on a method for
constructing BR-canonical models.
Before stating the correspondence between `BR and |=BR which we are go-
ing to prove in this section we need to introduce some notation. Given a set of
formulas Σ, we use e(Σ) to denote the set of formulas i : ∃y y = →x such that →x
is an arrow variable that occurs in a formula in Σ. e(Σ) intuitively contains the
statements of existence for all the arrow variables in Σ.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness theorem).
(Γ,Σ) `BR i :φ⇐⇒ Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
i:σ∈Σ
σ ⊃ φ
where Γ is the set of global assumptions and Σ is the set of local assumptions of
the formula tree Π with root i :φ.
This theorem states that the calculus defined in the previous section computes
a derivability relation `BR which corresponds to the consequence relation |=BR
between the global assumptions Γ of `BR and the logical implication of i :φ from
the conjunction of all the local assumptions in Σ (that is, i :
∧
i:σ∈Σ σ ⊃ φ), modulo
the existence of all the arrow variables in Σ (that is, e(Σ)). Its proof is a direct
consequence of the proofs of Soundness and Completeness that can be found in B
and C, respectively.
6 Analysing formalisms for distributed knowledge
through DFOL
The need to represent and reason about distributed and context-dependent knowl-
edge able to deal with semantic heterogeneity has fostered the development of
various logical formalisms. Areas such as the Semantic Web, Databases, Linked
Data, and Peer-to-Peer systems have seen a quest for logics able to represent and
reason about knowledge contained in sets of different knowledge bases that de-
scribe overlapping knowledge by means of heterogeneous schemata. Examples
are: mappings between overlapping ontologies or DB schemas, or relations be-
tween different contexts. All these formalisms make (implicit or explicit) as-
sumptions about the following questions: (i) what is the structure (hierarchical,
peer-to-peer, mediator based) in which the different local knowledge bases are
embedded?; (ii) which is the type of knowledge that can be represented in each
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KB (e.g., only local knowledge, views on knowledge of other KBs, . . . )?; (iii)
what type of domain is used to interpret the local knowledge (i.e., local domain
or global domain)?; (iv) are there any relations between local domains and which
ones (e.g., intersection, mapping, subset, identity, . . . )?; (v) what are the rela-
tions between local truth in different KBs? In this section, we consider a sig-
nificant number of the most relevant first-order logic based frameworks for the
representation of static and semantically heterogeneous distributed knowledge-
base systems and show how their encoding in DFOL allows us to make these
assumptions explicit8. Finally, we briefly discuss the relationship between DFOL
and non-monotonic extensions of the original multi-context systems (MCS) in-
troduced in [32, 28] focusing especially on the equilibria-based MCS introduced
in [9].
6.1 Quantified Modal Logics
Quantified modal logic (QML) [25] extends a first-order language with modal op-
erators. The semantics of QML is based on possible worlds. In its general form,
the semantics of non logical symbols depends upon the possible worlds. Several
important issues in QML arise from the combined semantics of quantifiers and
modal operators. These issues have originated the development of different se-
mantics for QML [25], which can be represented in DFOL using different bridge
rules. In the remaining of this section, we provide an example of how to repre-
sent different QML semantics via DFOL bridge rules by focusing on its original
Kripke semantics (Section 6.1.1) and on the more recent counterpart semantics
(Section 6.1.2). For the sake of simplicity we restrict our comparison to QML
without equality.
6.1.1 Kripke semantics for QML
A QML language is obtained by extending a first-order languageLwith the modal
operator. The simplest semantics for QLM is based on possible worlds. A QML
modelMQML is a 4-tuple 〈W ,R,D, I〉, whereW is a non empty set of worlds,
R a binary relation onW , D is a function that associates to each w a non empty
set D(w), satisfying wRv ⇒ D(w) ⊆ D(v), and I is a function that associates
to each w an interpretation I(w) of a first-order language L on the domain D(w).
8For space reason, the related formalisms will be described informally. Sometimes we have
simplified them. Nevertheless, our descriptions are consistent with the original formulations.
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Satisfiability is defined as usual on atomic formulas and propositional connectives.
Universal quantification is interpreted w.r.t. the domain of the current world:
M, w |= ∀x.φ[a] iffM, w |= φ[a(x := d)] for all d ∈ D(w)
where a[x := d] denotes the assignment obtained by setting a(x) = d in a. Modal
formulas are interpreted as follows:
M, w |= φ iffM, v |= φ for all v with wRv (37)
QML can be translated in a DFOL on a countable set I = {0, 1, 2, . . . } of indices.
Each Li (the language associated to the index i ∈ I) is obtained by extending L
with an n-ary predicate ‘φ’(x) for every formula φ(x) ∈ Li−1 that contains n
distinct free variables x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. Intuitively ‘φ’(t1, . . . , tn) denotes the
proposition stating that the tuple of objects denoted by 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 has necessarily
the property denoted by the Li−1-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn). Notice that the formulas
‘φ’(t1, . . . , tn) and‘φ(t1, . . . , tn)’ are syntactically and semantically different.
The first is the atomic formula obtained by applying the n-ary predicate ‘φ’ to
〈t1, . . . , tn〉, while the second is a 0-ary predicate, i.e., an atomic proposition. This
difference corresponds to the two readings of the modal formula φ(t1, . . . , tn)
called “de re” (the former) and “de dicto” (the latter).
The translation τQML from QML formulas into Li formulas is defined as fol-
lows: τQML is the identity transformation on formulas with no modal operators,
and it distributes over connectives and quantifiers. If φ is a formula with n distinct
free variables that contains at most i−1 nested modal operators, then τQML(φ) =
‘τQML(φ)’(x1, . . . , xn). To provide the DFOL version of the semantics of 
defined in (37), we use the following bridge rules, where x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉,
→i
x = 〈→ix1 , . . . ,→ixn 〉 and i+1→x = 〈i+1→x1 , . . . , i+1→xn 〉:
i+ 1 : ‘φ’(→ix )→ i : φ(x) (38)
i : (
k∧
i=1
φi ⊃ ψ)(i+1→x )→ i+ 1 : (
k∧
i=1
‘φi’ ⊃ ‘ψ’)(x) (39)
→ i : i+k→x = i+k→x , k > 0 (40)
The set of bridge rules (38)–(40), called BRQML, allows one to prove the DFOL
translation of the (K) axiom for QML (i.e., ∀x((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ φ ⊃ ψ)) and
of the Barcan formula (i.e., ∀xφ(x) ⊃ ∀xφ(x)). This implies that DFOL is
stronger than QML. The opposite relation from QML to DFOL is stated in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 2. LetMQML = 〈W ,R,D, I〉 a QML model. For every w ∈ W there
is a DFOL modelM that satisfies BRQML, andM is such that
MQML, w |= φ[a] if and only ifM |= i : τQML(φ)[a],
where i is greater or equal to the number of nested modal operators of φ.
Proof. Given MQML = 〈W ,R,D, I〉, for every w ∈ W and for every index
i ∈ I , we define a DFOL model M. Let i be the maximum number of nested
modal operators in φ. For every j ≤ i we define the setWj ⊆ W as follows:
• Wi = {w};
• Wj−1 = R(Wj) = {w′ ∈ W | w′′Rw′ for some w′′ ∈ Wj} for j ≤ i.
We then defineM as follows:
• domj = D(w) for j ≥ i;
• domj−1 = domj ∪
⋃
w′∈Wj−1 D(w′) for 1 ≤ j ≤ i;
• M0 = {I(w′) | w′ ∈ W0};
• Mj contains an interpretation m(w′) of the language Lj for every w′ ∈
Wj; m(w′) extends I(w′) with the interpretation of the predicate ‘φ’,
obtained by setting (‘φ’)m(w′) = {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ domnj | MQML, w′ |=
φ[x1 := d1, . . . , xn := dn]} when x1, . . . , xn are all the free variables of
φ;
• ri,j = {〈d, d〉 | d ∈ dommax(i,j)}.
It can be easily proved that M satisfies the bridge rules BRQML. We prove the
main theorem by induction on φ.
Base case If φ is an atomic formula in L, then τQML(φ) = φ. MQML, w |= φ[a]
iff I(w) |= φ[a]. Since Mi contains only one single model m(w), which
coincides with I(w) on the interpretation of the symbols in L, thenMi |=
τQML(φ)[a], and thereforeM |= i : τQML(φ)[a].
Step case The cases for connectives and quantifiers are routine; let us consider
the case of φ. Suppose that MQML, w |= φ[a]. This holds if and only
if for all w′, with wRw′, MQML, w′ |= φ[a]. By construction of m(w),
m(w) |= ‘φ’[a] and since m(w) is the only element ofMi, we have that
Mi |= ‘φ’[a], and thereforeM |= i : τQML(φ)[a].
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The DFOL encoding of QML shown above decouples the semantics of the
modal operator , captured by bridge rules (38) and (39), and the assumptions
on the possible worlds domains, captured by the bridge rule (40). Different as-
sumptions on the possible worlds domains can be encoded by means of different
bridge rules on the equality predicate, thus retaining the bridge rules for  un-
changed. On the contrary, in QML, the semantics of the  operator needs to be
adapted to the different assumptions made on the worlds domains. As an example,
decreasing domains can be axiomatized using the bridge rule:
→ i+ n : i→x = i→x ; (41)
and constant domains can be axiomatised by adopting both (40) and (41).
A further source of variations in the semantics of QML concerns the interpre-
tation of terms in the scope of a modal operator. For instance what is the meaning
of the formula P (a) when a denotes, in the current world, an object which
does not exist in one of the accessible worlds? Or similarly, in evaluating P (a)
should a be interpreted in the current worlds or in all the accessible worlds? In
DFOL this ambiguity is solved by providing a syntax for both semantics: the for-
mula (‘P (x)’(a)) corresponds to the semantics of P (a) where a is evaluated
in the current world (“de re”), whereas the formula ‘P (a)’ corresponds to the
semantics of P (a) where a is evaluated in each accessible world (“de dicto”).
6.1.2 Counterpart semantics for QML
To overcome all the difficulties introduced in the Kripke semantics by the interpre-
tation of objects across different worlds, a new semantics for QML called coun-
terpart theory, has been recently introduced [3, 63, 43]. Counterpart semantics
extends Kripke semantics by adding relations between objects in different worlds.
These relations are similar to domain relations in DFOL. The semantics proposed
in [3, 63] extends standard QML models with unconstrained domains, (i.e., for
every w ∈ W , D(w) is an arbitrary non empty set) with a counterpart relation C
that maps every pair 〈w, v〉 ∈ W ×W to a subset of D(w)×D(v). Satisfiability
of modal formulas is defined as follows:
• MCP, w |= φ(x1, . . . , xn)[a],, where a is an assignment to the free vari-
ables of φ in D(w), if and only ifMCP, w |= φ[a′], for every world w′ with
wRw′ and for every assignment a′ to the free variables of φ into the domain
D(w′), such that 〈a(xi), a′(xi)〉 ∈ C(w,w′).
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With this semantics (which we call basic counterpart semantics), however, the
(K) schema no longer holds. The approach presented in [3, 63] overcomes this
drawback by deviating from first-order semantics either by adopting typed first-
order or free logics (with partial assignments to variables). Since DFOL is based
on a first-order semantics for local models, we have to limit the comparison to
the basic counterpart semantics. If we take the language of QML and the trans-
formation form QML to DFOL seen in the previous section, then we can for-
malise the counterpart semantics in DFOL. Let BRCP be the set of bridge rules
(39), (38), {Ci,j,k}i>j>k∈I . Let τCP be defined as τQML. The following theorem
formally states the correspondence between counterpart semantics and DFOL.
Theorem 3. LetMCP = 〈W ,R,D, C, I〉 a counterpart frame. For every w ∈ W
there is a DFOL modelM that satisfies BRCP such that
MCP, w |= φ[a] if and only ifM |= i : τCP(φ)[a]
where i is greater or equal to the number of nested modal operators of φ.
Proof (outline). The proof is the same as the one given for QML, with the only
difference that the the domain relation ofM is defined as follows:
• rij for i > j is defined in two phases. First we define ri,i−1, and then ri,i−k
as the composition of the relations ri,i−1, . . . , ri−k+1,i−k.
rj,j−1 =
⋃
w′∈Mj
w′′∈Mj−1
Cw′,w′′ (42)
rj,j−k = rj,j−1 ◦ · · · ◦ rj−k+1,j−k (43)
6.2 Quantified logic of contexts
Quantified logic of contexts (QLC) is a formalism for reasoning about proposi-
tions with context dependent truth values. QLC was originally introduced in [11]
and further developed in [50, 34]. In what follows we refer to the original for-
mulation of QLC for two reasons: first, it is a formulation closer to the original
logic of context introduced by John McCarthy in [53] and to DFOL; second, the
work in [50, 34] extends the formalism introduced in [11] with the possibility of
quantifying over contexts, which is not allowed in DFOL, as it would correspond
to quantifying over indices in I .
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In the formulation described in [11], the language of QLC is a two sorted first-
order language L extended with the modal operator ist(k, φ) formalising the fact
that the formula φ is true in the context k. The two sorts of L are: a sort for objects
and a sort for contexts. The set of terms of sort context is hereafter denoted with
K. A QLC modelMQLC is defined starting from two disjoint sets ∆c and ∆d, used
to interpret terms of sort context and terms of sort object, respectively. MQLC is
a function that associates to each element of ∆c a set of interpretations of L on
∆ = ∆d ∪∆c such that
for all terms t of L, tI = tI′ for all I ∈ MQLC(c) and I ′ ∈MQLC(c′) (44)
Restriction (44) amounts to assume that terms are rigid designators: i.e., a term
denotes the same object in all contexts.
QLC can be translated in an equivalent DFOL on the set K of indices. The
language of the k-th context, Lk, extends the first-order language L of QLC
with an extra sort for interpreting well-formed formulas (wffs), the binary pred-
icate ist(x, y) with x of sort context and y of sort wff, and a function symbol
fφ(x1, . . . , xn) for every formula φ with n distinct free variables x1, . . . , xn (if φ
is a closed formula fφ is a constant). The term fφ(x1,...,xn)(c1, . . . , cn) is used to
denote the formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) where each xi is replaced with ci. Formulas of
the form ist(k, w) are complete. We define a translation τ from the language of
QLC to DFOL as hinted below. Without loss of generality we assume that QLC
formulas are in prenex normal form, and that existential quantifiers have been
removed by introducing Skolem constants/functions.
(i) τ(φ) = φ if φ is any expression (term or formula) of L;
(ii) τ distributes over connectives;
(iii) τ(ist(k, φ(x1, . . . , xn))) = ist(k, fτ(φ)(τ(x1), . . . , τ(xn)).
In QLC, the semantics of the ist operator is analogous to the one of the 
operator in modal logics. Namely I |= ist(k, φ) iff for all I ′ ∈ MQLC(kI),
I ′ |= φ. The two semantics however are not completely equivalent. Indeed in
QLC, the schema ist(k, φ∨ ist(k′, ψ)) ⊃ ist(k, φ)∨ ist(k, ist(k′, ψ)) is valid, while
the corresponding modal axiom (φ ∨ψ) ⊃ φ ∨ψ is not.
QLC semantics is axiomatised by adding specific axioms and specific infer-
ence rules. An example of axiom is the one corresponding to the modal axiom (K)
for ist: ist(k, φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ist(k, φ) ⊃ ist(k, φ). An example of rules is the “enter
context” rule: k : ist(k′, φ)⇒ k′ : φ. In DFOL, the semantics of the ist predicate
is axiomatised by means of bridge rules. The relation between the truth of the
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formula ist(k, fφ) in a context h and the truth of φ in the context k is axiomatised
with the following bridge rules:
h : ist(k, fφ(
→k
x1 , . . . ,
→k
xn ))→ k : φ(x1, . . . , xn) (45)
k : φ(
→h
x1 , . . . ,
→h
xn )→ h : ist(k, fφ(x1, . . . , xn)) (46)
QLC assumes constant domains, which in DFOL corresponds to isomorphic do-
mains. Isomorphic domains can be imposed by the restriction Fkh,Tkh, Jkh and
Ikh for every pair of contextual terms k, h ∈ K. Furthermore, the rigid designation
assumption (44) can be axiomatised using the bridge rule:
k : x = t→ h : k→x = t (47)
Let BRQLC be the set of bridge rules {Fkh,Tkh, Jkh, Ikh, (47), (46), (45)}.
Theorem 4. For every QLC modelMQLC and any assignment a to the variables
of L, there is a DFOL modelM that satisfies BRQLC such thatMQLC |= k : φ[a]
if and only ifM |= k : τ(φ)[τ(a)], where τ(a) is the DFOL assignment such that
τ(a)i(x) = τ(a)k(
h→
x ) = τ(a)k(
→h
x ) = a(x)9.
Proof. For every k ∈ K, domk = ∆c∪∆d∪∆wff. ∆wff is a countable set disjoint
from ∆c ∪ ∆d that is used to interpret the terms of sort wff (i.e., the terms of the
form fφ(. . . )). For any I ∈ MQLC(c) with c ∈ ∆c, we define τ(I, a), which is an
interpretation of the language Lk obtained extending I as follows:
(i) f
τ(I)
φ (t
τ(I)
1 , . . . , t
τ(I)
n ) = f
τ(I)
φ(t1,...,tn)
for every n-tuple of terms 〈t1, . . . , tn〉.
(ii) istτ(I) = {〈c, w〉 ∈ ∆c ×∆wff | MQLC(c) |= φ and φτ(I,a) = d}
The DFOL model τ(MQLC, a), corresponding to the QLC modelMQLC and the
assignment a, is then defined as the pair 〈{Mi}, {rij}〉 as follows:
(i) rkh is the identity function on ∆c ∪∆d ∪∆wff;
(ii) Mk = {τ(I) | I ∈ MQLC(kI,a), where kI,a is the interpretation of the term
k w.r.t., I and the assignment a.
We show by induction thatMQLC |= k : φ[a] iff τ(MQLC, a) |= k : φ[a]
9Variables are rigid designators
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Base case if φ is a formula of L (i.e., it does not contain the ist operator), then
MQLC |= k : φ[a] iff for all I ∈ MQLC(kI,a), I |= φ[a] iffMk |= φ[τ(a)]
iff τ(MQLC, a) |= k : φ[τ(a)].
Step case We show only the case of the ist operator. The other cases are routine.
MQLC |= k : ist(h, φ)[a] iff for all I ∈ MQLC(hI,a), I |= φ[a] iffMQLC |=
h : φ[a]. By induction this holds iffMh |= φ[τ(a)] which is true iffMk |=
ist(h, fφ(x1, . . . , xn))[τ(a)]. Notice that, the last step follows from the fact
that τ(MQLC) satisfies the bridge rules BRQLC
6.3 Ontology mapping and ontology integration formalisms
A number of formalisms for distributed knowledge representation have originated
in the field of ontology integration and are based on Description Logics (DLs) as
a logic for the representation of a single knowledge base (ontology). A compar-
ison between DFOL and several of these formalisms is described in [68]. In the
following we recall and extend the results for Distributed Description Logics, -
connection, Package-based Description Logics (P-DL) [1] and peer-to-peer (P2P)
data integration [13].
6.3.1 Distributed Description Logics
Distributed Description Logics (DDL) [65, 40, 62] and C-OWL [8] are logical for-
malisms for ontology mapping where ontologies are expressed using description
logics. DDL extends description logics with a local semantics similar to that of
DFOL and so-called bridge rules to represent semantic relations between differ-
ent T-Boxes. A distributed interpretation for DDL on a family of DL languages
{Li} is a family {Ii} of interpretations, one for each Li, plus a family {rij}i 6=j∈I
of domain relations. While the original proposal only considers subsumption be-
tween concept expressions, DDL has been extended in [30, 69, 31, 51] to support
mappings between (binary) relations, individuals, concept-to-relation (and vice-
versa), and, finally, fuzzy values. In DDL, ontology mappings are expressions of
the form i :φ v−→ j :ψ and i :φ w−→ j :ψ where φ and ψ are either concepts, indi-
viduals, or role expressions of the descriptive languages Li and Lj respectively10.
The satisfiability conditions of DDL ontology mappings are:
10In this definition, to be more homogeneous, we consider interpretations of individuals to be
sets containing a single object rather than the object itself.
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• I |= i : φ v−→ j : ψ if rij(φIi) ⊆ ψIj ;
• I |= i : φ w−→ j : ψ if rij(φIi) ⊇ ψIj ;
Since the notion of DDL model is based on the same principles as that of DFOL,
we can directly translate DDL bridge rules into DFOL bridge rules. In particular,
there are no additional assumptions about the nature of the domains that need to
be modelled. The translation is the following:
DDL DFOL
i :φ
v−→ j :ψ i :φ(→jx )→ j :ψ(x)
i :φ
w−→ j :ψ j :ψ(x)→ j :φ(→jx )
In [40] additional constraints on the domain relation are added in order to augment
the information flow between different ontologies induced by DDL ontology map-
pings. Of particular interest are the bridge rules that support the transitive propa-
gation of mappings:
i : A
v−→ j : B and j : B v−→ k : C ⇒ i : A v−→ k : C (48)
i : A
w−→ j : B and j : B w−→ k : C ⇒ i : A w−→ k : C (49)
which correspond to the entailment between the following DFOL bridge rules:
i : A(
→j
x )→ j : B(x)
j : B(
→k
x )→ k : C(x)
=⇒ i : A(→kx )→ k : C(x) (50)
k : C(x)→ j : B(→kx )
j : B(x)→ i : A(→jx )
=⇒ k : C(x)→ i : A(→kx ) (51)
Since conditions (50) and (51) must hold for any interpretation of A, B, and C,
then the entailments can be obtained by imposing condition rij ◦ rjk = rik among
domain relations, which corresponds to bridge rules Cijk.
6.3.2 -connections
A further approach for defining mappings between DL knowledge bases has emerged
from the investigation of so-called -connections between abstract description sys-
tems [44, 19]. In the -connections framework, for every pair of ontologies i and
j there is a set ij of links, which represent binary relations between the domain
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of the i-th ontology and the domain of the j-th ontology. Links from i to j can
be used to define i concepts in a way that is analogous to how roles are used to
define concepts. In the table below we report the syntax and the semantics of the
i-concepts definition based on links, where E denotes a link from i to j and ψ
denotes a concept in j. The only assumption about the relation between domains
is global inconsistency, that is, the fact that the inconsistency of a local knowledge
base makes the whole system inconsistent.
In comparing DFOL with -connections we can notice that in DFOL there
is only one relation from i to j, while in -connection there are many possible
relations. However, [68] shows how to represent each rij as a relation in ij and
provides a detailed description of how the concept definition based on links of
-connections can be codified in DFOL. In a nutshell, to represent -connections
in DFOL it is enough to label each arrow variable with the proper link name. The
arrow variable
own→ i
x is read as the arrow variable
→i
x where rij is intended to be
the interpretation of Ownij . With this syntactic extension of DFOL, the concept
definition based on links (denoted as E) can be codified in DFOL as follows11:
-conn. DFOL
φ v ∃E.ψ i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i
E→
x )
φ v ∀E.ψ i :φ(
E→j
x )→ j :ψ(x)
φ v≥ nE.ψ i :∧nk=1 φ(x1)→ j :∧nk 6=h=1 ψ(iE→xk ) ∧ xk 6= xh
φ v≤ nE.ψ i :φ(x) ∧∧n+1k=1 x = E→jx k → j :∨n+1k=1 (ψ(xk) ⊃ ∨h6=k xh = xk)
6.3.3 Package-based Description Logics
(P-DL) [1] is a formalism focused on ontology import, that is, it allows a subset
of concepts, relations, and individuals defined in one ontology to be imported into
another ontology where they are then reused. These ontologies are called, in P-DL
terms, packages. In a nutshell, a package-based ontology is a SHOIQ ontology
P which is partitioned into a finite set of packages {P}i∈I , using an index set I .
Each Pi uses its own alphabet of terms. The alphabets are not mutually disjoint,
but for any term t there is a unique home package of t, denoted by home(t). The
importing of a term of Pi in Pj is denoted with the expression Pi
t→ Pj , while
11A more detailed comparison between -connections and DFOL is contained in [68].
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Pi
∗→ Pj is used to denote the transitive closure of→. A distributed interpretation
of P is composed of a set of interpretations, one for each package, plus a set of
domain relations similar to the ones of DFOL. The main difference with DFOL is
that each rij is an injective partial function, and that if i
∗→ j and j ∗→ k then rik
is defined as the composition rij ◦ rjk. As shown in Figure 6, these restrictions
can be formalised using the bridge rules Jij and Cijk. The semantics of the import
of a term t, expressed by Pi
t→ Pj , is defined as rij(tIi) = tIj . If t is a description
logic concept (unary predicate) φ(x), then the import can be represented in DFOL
by the pair of bridge rules:
i :φ(
→j
x )→ j :φ(x) (52)
j :φ(x)→ i :φ(i→x ) (53)
while if t is an individual a, then the import can be represented in DFOL by the
bridge rule:
i :x = a→ j :→ix = a (54)
If t is a role (binary predicate) φ(x, y) then we can define analogous bridge rules,
and also impose that rij is role preserving, that is, if (x, y) ∈ φIi , then rij(x) 6= ∅
iff rij(y) 6= ∅.
6.3.4 Logical foundation of peer-to-peer (P2P) data integration
The work in [13] defines an epistemic semantics for P2P systems and applies it
to different architectures of P2P systems. The epistemic semantics is based on
the introduction of a modal operator K used to express what is known by peers.
Mapping assertions of the form cqS  cqG represent the fact that all the data
satisfying the (conjunctive) query cqS over the sources also satisfy the concept in
the peer schema represented by cqG. This mapping assertion is captured, in the
epistemic semantics, by an axiom of the form:
∀x(K(∃y bodycqS(x,y)) ⊃ ∃z bodycqG(x, z))
which states that only what is known in S is transferred to G. Differently from
DFOL, the epistemic semantics presented in [13] provides a unique model of the
P2P system, based on a single domain of interpretation. Similarly to DFOL, this
semantics addresses the problem of the representation of complete and incomplete
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information. In fact, the modal operator K can be considered a way of dealing
with non-complete formulas and to consider, in the mappings, only their “com-
plete part” (that is, the tuples that belong to the interpretation of that formula in
all possible models).
6.4 Annotated Logic
Annotated logics [71] is a formalism that has been applied to a variety of aspects
in knowledge representation, expert systems, quantitative reasoning, and hybrid
databases. In annotated logics it is possible to integrate a set of logical theories
in an unique amalgamated theory. The amalgamated theory is the disjoint union
of the original theories plus a set of clauses (called amalgamated clauses) which
resolve conflicts due to inconsistent facts and compose uncertain information of
different theories. One of the main similarities with our approach is the capability
to cope with inconsistent knowledge bases. Annotated logics provide an explicit
way to solve conflicts. The main difference between annotated logics and DFOL
concerns the ability to represent different interpretation domains. Annotated log-
ics have a single logical language, and the same symbol in different knowledge
bases is interpreted in the same object. This of course might be solved by indexing
the constant with the name of the knowledge base. In this case explicit relational
symbols between objects of different knowledge bases should be introduced.
6.5 Original DFOL
We conclude this section by illustrating the difference between the version of
DFOL presented in this paper and the original version introduced in [29], here
denoted with DFOL0. The first difference concerns arrow variables. In the current
version of DFOL arrow variables are part of the syntax of the local languages
and of the bridge rules. In DFOL0 arrow variables are a meta-notation of the
calculus, which is used to keep track of the dependencies between variables in
different modules. Arrow variables, therefore, are not part of the logical language
of DFOL0 and no semantics is provided for them. Also, the bridge rules of DFOL0
(called interpretation constraints) do not contain arrow variables. Thus the DFOL0
bridge rule i : φ(x)→ j : ψ(x) corresponds to the DFOL bridge rule i : φ(→jx )→
j : ψ(x). The introduction of bridge rules in the logical language of DFOL is not
only a matter of syntax: arrow variables extend the expressivity of the language.
Indeed, in DFOL0 there is no way of expressing a constraint represented by a
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DFOL bridge rules with arrow variables in the conclusion. For instance, the fact
“for all the objects of type A in i there is a corresponding object of type B in j”
is represented by means of the DFOL bridge rule i : A(x)→ j : B(i→x ) and is not
expressible in DFOL0.
A second important difference is the fact that arrow variables allow to unify
the two types of constraints introduced in DFOL0: domain constraints and inter-
pretation constraints. Domain constraints between i and j are constraints on the
domain of i and j, while interpretation constraints are constraints between the
interpretations of the symbols in i and j modulo the transformation via domain
relation rij . As shown in section 4 bridge rules with arrow variables enable the
formalisation of a wide set of relations between (two or more) domains together
with relations between predicates. On the contrary, the only domain constraints
allowed in DFOL0 are rij being total or surjective, which correspond to the bridge
rules Tij and Sij in Figure 6.
Third, in DFOL0 bridge rules (interpretation constraints) connect only two
KBs, that is, they are of the form i : φ(x) → j : ψ(x′), where x′ ⊆ x are two
sets of variables. In DFOL we generalise bridge rules by allowing more than one
index in the premise.
Finally, in this paper we have defined a notion of logical consequence be-
tween bridge rules. This notion is very important when formalising reasoning
about ontology mapping. In fact it makes possible to check the consistency, the
redundancy, and the inter-dependency of sets of ontology mappings (see [55, 56]
for example). Given a set of DFOL bridge rules BR, the problem of checking if
the bridge rule br = i1 : φ1, . . . , inφn → i : φ is a logical consequence of BR can
be formulated as the problem of proving i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn |=BR i : φ.
6.6 Equilibria based Multi-context systems
The last decade has seen a number non-monotonic extensions of the original
multi-context systems (MCS) introduced in the 90’s [32, 28]. The work in [61]
extends MCS with minimal beliefs, while [10] introduces default reasoning with
contexts. A notable generalisation of MCS was proposed in [9], where the focus of
the work is the ability to deal with distributed heterogeneous reasoning systems,
that is, systems that adopt different logics in the different contexts (knowledge
modules). The semantics of this version of MCS is called equilibria based seman-
tics. Given the semantics of a set of local logics (that can be either monotonic or
non monotonic logics) the equilibria based semantics is obtained by composing
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the local semantics with a methodology inspired to the answer set programming
paradigm.
When comparing DFOL with equilibria based MCS, we need to take into ac-
count some important aspects. DFOL and equilibria based MCS have been devel-
oped to tackle different forms of heterogeneity. From the one hand, DFOL focuses
on capturing the heterogeneity that arises in integrating knowledge bases that de-
scribe different but overlapping or interconnected domains expressed in a set of
first-order languages. On the other hand, equilibria based MCS focus on captur-
ing the heterogeneity that arises in integrating knowledge bases expressed using
different logics. From this perspective, DFOL can be seen as a special case of
equilibria based MCS. However, due to their generality, equilibria based MCS do
not provide a specific investigation on specific relations between heterogeneous
domains, semantic shifting of symbols across different contexts, rigid and non-
rigid semantics of constants, and so on. These aspects are the ones that DFOL
analyses in terms of specific bridge rules. A second difference concerns the dif-
ferent reasoning tasks the two systems are focused on. Equilibria based MCS is a
formalism developed with the aim of supporting query answering. Thus, the em-
phasis is on the computation of equilibria KBs which can then be queried. DFOL
is instead focused on the notion of logical consequence and bridge rules entail-
ment. Thus, the emphasis is on the definition of a semantics and a calculus that
axiomatise mapping entailment.
In the following comparison, therefore, we will concentrate only on the com-
mon aspects of DFOL and MCS. In particular we restrict to a specific version of
DFOL, where bridge rules involve only closed formulas, and to a specific version
of equilibria based MCS, where the local logics are propositional or first-order
classical logics. In other words we omit arrow variables and the contribution of
the domain relation in the semantics of DFOL and the ability to deal with different
logics in equilibria based MCS. Note that a complete formal comparison of equi-
libria based MCS and DFOL is out of the scope of this paper. In the following
we provide some insights and an example about this correspondence. A thorough
comparison is left for future work.
As already said we focus on MCS where each KB is formalised by means of a
propositional or first-order classical logic. This does not make the resulting system
monotonic. In fact, an important characteristic of equilibria based MCS are bridge
rules that can introduce a form of non monotonicity. Let us go a bit more into
details considering a correspondence between DFOL and equilibria based MCS
when the local KBs are modelled using propositional logic.
Let MCS be an MCS defined on a set I of classical propositional logics with
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languages {Li}i∈I . The corresponding DFOL logic DFOLMCS is obtained by ex-
tending the set of contexts (indexes) with a meta context mc that contains the
propositional letter not(j : p) for every propositional letter p ∈ Lj , j ∈ I . We
also assume that not(j : p) in mc is complete. Since propositions of the form
not(i : p) occur only in mc, we simplify the notation by omitting the index mc.
The semantics of not(j : p) is fixed by the bridge rules (55) and (56)12, while
(57) enables to export an inconsistency to the meta context mc:
j : p→ ¬not(j : p) (55)
¬not(j : p)→ j : p (56)
i : ⊥ → mc : ⊥ (57)
As a consequence of these rules
M |= not(i : p) if and only if there is a model m ∈Mi such that m 6|= p. (58)
Furthermore, Mmc is completely defined by the set {Mi}i∈I . In other words,
Mmc |= not(i : p) if and only ifMi 6|= p.
For each bridge rule of MCS which is of the form:
i : p← i1 : p1, . . . , in : pn,not(ji : q1), . . . ,not(jm : qm)
we add the following bridge rule br into DFOLMCS:
i1 : p1, . . . , in : pn,not(j1 : q1), . . . ,not(jm : qm)→ i : p
Following the logic programming notation, we use head(br) to denote i : p and
body(br) to denote the set {i1 : p1, . . . , in : pn,not(j1 : q1), . . . ,not(jm : qm)}
Given a modelM for DFOLMCS, its local reduction LR(M) is the DFOLMCS
model obtained by removing from each Mi any model m such that there exists
a model m′ ∈ Mi, with m 6= m′, such that m′ |= p implies m |= p for all
propositional letters p ∈ Li. Notice that ifM is a DFOLMCS model then LR(M)
is also a DFOLMCS model.
We use local reductions to compute minimal models of DFOLMCS as follows:
• M(0) is the DFOLMCS model such that M (0)i contains all the models of Li
that satisfy the local axioms.
12Similar bridge rules have been introduced and studied in [17, 18] under the name of reflection
rules. They have been widely applied to the modular representation of beliefs in multi-agent
systems (see, e.g., [5, 27, 22]).
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• M(k+1) is obtained by deleting from M (k)i all the models that do not sat-
isfy the consequence of some bridge rule if all its premises are satisfied by
M(k). Formally M (k+1)i = {m ∈ M (k)i | M(k) |= body(br) ⇒ m |=
head(br) for all br ∈ BRDFOLMCS} and Mk+1mc is updated according to con-
dition (58).
• M∗ is the fix-point of this operator. The fix-point exists since the bridge
rules have only a finite number of premises.
• The minimal model of DFOLMCS is equal to LR(M∗).
Such a minimal model is the analogous of the grounded equilibrium as defined
in [9]. To show how this construction works we consider the example similar to
Example 3 in [9].
Example 9. Consider the DFOLMCS consisting of two contexts 1 and 2. Suppose
that there are no local axioms and that the set of bridge rules BR contains the two
standard bridge rules 2 : q → 1 : p and 1 : p → 2 : q and the non monotonic
bridge rule
not(1 : p)→ 2 : r. (59)
In the following table we show step by step the construction of RL(M∗).
M M1 M2 Mmc
M(0) {{}, {p}} {{}, {q}, {r}, {q, r}} {{not(1 : p),not(2 : q),not(2 : r)}}
M(1) {{}, {p}} {{r}, {q, r}} {{not(1 : p),not(2 : q)}}
M(2) {{}, {p}} {{r}, {q, r}} {{not(1 : p),not(2 : q)}}
RL(M(2)) {{}} {{r}} {{not(1 : p),not(2 : q)}}
M(0) is the DFOLMCS model such that each M0i satisfies the local axioms. Since
there are no local axioms M01 and M
0
2 contain all the possible local models. The
only applicable rule to compute M1 is bridge rule (59), which can be applied be-
cause M0mc satisfies not(2 : r). Thus, M
1 is obtained by removing all the models
that do not satisfy r from M02 and by removing not(2 : r) from M
1
mc to comply
with condition (58). After that no more rules are applicable. ThusM(2) provides
the fix-pointM∗. The last step of our computation concerns the computation of
the local reduction RL(M(2) ofM(2) which terminates the computation. As we
can see from its construction, the resulting model RL(M(2)) satisfies only 2 : r,
1 : ¬p and 2 : ¬q.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a systematic account of Distributed First Order
Logic (DFOL) and we have shown how the notions of domain relation, arrow
variable and bridge rule enable the characterisation of a wide range of semantic
relationships between different KBs belonging to a distributed knowledge base
systems modelled by means of (subsets of) first-order logics, each KB having its
own domain of interpretation. Moreover, we have defined a sound and complete
calculus which characterises the notion of DFOL logical consequence, and we
have illustrated how to use it to infer logical relations between distributed knowl-
edge.
Acknowledgments
This paper has benefitted from many discussions with Massimo Benerecetti, Paolo
Bouquet, Loris Bozzato and Holger Wache. The influence of the work on multi-
context logics by Fausto Giunchiglia and his co-authors has been significant through-
out the paper. We thank Chiara Di Francescomarino, Ivan Donadello, and Ric-
cardo De Masellis for their help in polishing the paper, and the anonymous review-
ers for their constructive comments, which helped us to improve the manuscript.
A Examples of DFOL Deductions
In this section we provide examples of deductions in DFOL by proving the bridge
rule entailments described in Proposition 10. As usual, we write BR(n) to denote
the inference rule obtained from the bridge rule (n).
Conjunction
(Fij) i :
→j
x =
→j
y → j :x = y
(a) i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x )
(b) i :φ′(x)→ j :ψ′(i→x )
 |= i :φ ∧ φ′(x)→ j :ψ ∧ ψ′(
i→
x )
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Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) ∧ φ′(x) (1) Assumption
(2) i : φ(x) (1) From (1) by ∧Ei
(3) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (2) by BR(35)
(4) i : φ′(x) (1) From (1) by ∧Ei
(5) i : x = z (5) Assumption
(6) i : φ′(z) (1)(5) From (4), (5) by =Ei
(7) j : ψ′(
i→
z ) (1)(5) From (6) by BR(36)
(8) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (8) Assumption
(9) j : ψ′(
i→
z ) (9) Assumption
(10) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (8)(9) From (8) and (9) by ∧Ij
(11) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (9) (1) From (3) and (10) by Cutji dis-
charging (8)
(11) j : ψ(
i→
x ) ∧ ψ′(i→z ) (1) From (7) and (11) by Cutji dis-
charging (9)
(12) j :
i→
x = y (12) Assumption
(13) i : x =
→j
y (12) From (12) by →jIji
(14) j :
i→
z = w (14) Assumption
(15) i : z =
→j
w (14) From (14) by →jIji
(16) i :
→i
y =
→i
w (5) (12)(14) from (5), (13) and (15) by =Ei and
applications of Cut to handle exis-
tential arrow variables
(17) j : y = w (5)(12)(14) From (16) by BRFij
(18) j :
i→
x =
i→
z (5)(12)(14) From (12), (14) and (18) by =Ej
(19) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5)(12)(14) From (11) and (18) by =Ej
(20) j :
i→
x =
i→
x (1) From (3) by =Ij
(21) j : ∃y i→x = y (1) From (20) by ∃Ij
(22) j :
i→
z =
i→
z (1)(5) From (7) by =Ij
(23) j : ∃w i→z = w (1) From (22) by ∃Ij
(24) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5)(14) From (19) and (21) by ∃Ej dis-
charging (12)
(25) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1)(5) From (23) and (24) by ∃Ej dis-
charging (14)
(26) i : z = z By =Ii
(27) i : ∃x x = z From (26) by ∃Ii
(27) j : ψ ∧ ψ′(i→x ) (1) From (25) and (26) by ∃Eji dis-
charging (5)
Composition
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(Cijk) j :
i→
x = z → k → k : i→x = z
(a) i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x )
(b) j :ψ(x)→ k :θ(j→x )
 |= i :φ(x)→ k :θ(
i→
x )
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) (1) Assumption
(2) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (1) by BR(a)
(3) j :
i→
x = y (3) Assumption
(4) j : ψ(y) (3) (1) From (2) and (3) by =Ej
(5) k : θ(
j→
y ) (3)(1) From (4) by BR(b)
(7) k :
j→
y = z (7) Assumption
(8) j : y = z → k (7) From (7) by →kIkj
(9) j :
i→
x = z → k (3)(7) From (3) and (8) by =Ej
(10) k :
i→
x = z (3)(7) From (9) by BRCijk
(11) k :
i→
x =
j→
y (3)(7) From (7) and (10) by =Ek
(12) k : θ(
i→
x ) (1)(3)(7) From (5) and (11) by =Ek
(13) k :
j→
y =
j→
y (1)(3) From (5) by =Ik
(14) k : ∃z.y=→i z (1)(3) From (13) by ∃Ik
(15) k : θ(
i→
x ) (1)(3) From (14) and (12) by ∃Ek dis-
charging (7)
(16) j :
i→
x =
i→
x (1) From (2) by =Ij
(17) j : ∃y.i→x = y (1) From (16) by ∃Ij
(18) k : θ(
i→
x ) (1) From (17) and (15) by ∃Ejk dis-
charging (3)
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Existential quantification
(a) i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x ) |= i :∃xφ(x)→ j :∃xψ(x)
under the assumption that φ is a complete formula.
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) (1) Assumption
(2) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (1) by BR(a)
(3) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (3) Assumption
(4) j : ∃x.ψ(x) (3) From (3) by ∃Ij
(5) j : ∃x.ψ(x) (1) From (2) and (4) by Cutji discharg-
ing (3)
(6) i : ∃x.φ(x) (6) Assumption
(7) j : ∃x.ψ(x) (7) From (5) and (6) by ∃Eji discharg-
ing (1)
Notice that the application ∃Eji in step (7) satisfies restriction R3 only if φ is a
complete formula.
Universal quantification
(Sij) j :x = x→ i :∃y y = →jx
(a) i :φ(
→j
x )→ j :ψ(x)
}
|= i :∀x φ(x)→ j :∀x ψ(x)
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : ∀x.φ(x) (1) Assumption
(2) i : φ(y) (1) From (1) by ∀Ei
(3) i : y =
→j
x (3) Assumption
(4) i : φ(
→j
x ) (1)(3) From (2) and (3) by =Ei
(5) j : ψ(x) (1)(3) From (4) by BR(a)
(6) j : x = x By =Ij
(7) i : ∃y.y = →jx From (6) by BRSij
(8) j : ψ(x) (1) From (5) and (7) by ∃Ei discharg-
ing (3)
(9) j :∀x ψ(x) (1) From (8) ∀Ii
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Disjunction
(a) i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x )
(b) i :φ′(x)→ j :ψ′(i→x )
}
|= i :φ ∨ φ′(x)→ j :ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x )
under the assumption that at least one among φ(x) and φ′(x) is a complete for-
mula.
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) (1) Assumption
(2) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (1) by BR
(3) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (3) Assumption
(4) j : ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x ) (3) From (3) by ∨Ij
(5) j : ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x ) (1) From (2) and (4) by Cutji
(6) i : φ′(x) (6) Assumption
(7) j : ψ′(
i→
x ) (6) From (6) by BR
(8) j : ψ′(
i→
x ) (8) Assumption
(9) j : ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x ) (8) From (8) by ∨Ij
(10) j : ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x ) (6) From (7) and (9) by Cutji
(11) i : φ ∨ φ′(x) (11) Assumption
(12) j : ψ ∨ ψ′(i→x ) (11) from (5), (10), and (11) by ∨Eji
discharging (1) and (6)
Note that ∨Eji can be applied at step (12) only if at least eone among φ and φ′ is
complete.
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Instantiation
(a) i :x = t→ j : i→x = s
(b) i :φ(
→j
x )→ j :ψ(x)
}
|= i :φ(t)→ j :ψ(s)
under the assumption that t is a complete ground term.
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : x = t (1) Assumption
(2) j :
i→
x = s (1) From (1) by BR(a)
(3) j : y =
i→
x (3) Assumption
(4) i :
→j
y = x (3) From (3) by →jI
(5) i :
→j
y = x (5) Assumption
(6) i :
→j
y = t (1)(5) From (1) and (5) by =Ei
(7) i :
→j
y = t (1) (3) From (4) and (6) by Cuti discharg-
ing (5)
(8) i : φ(t) (8) Assumption
(9) i : φ(
→j
y ) (1)(8) (3) From (7) and (8) by =Ei
(10) j : ψ(y) (1)(3)(8) From (9) by BR(b)
(11) j : ψ(s) (6)(1)(3) From (10),(3) and (2) by =Ej
(12) j :
i→
x =
i→
x (1) From (2) by =Ij
(13) j : ∃y y = i→x (1) From (12) by ∃Ij
(12) j : ψ(s) (6)(1) From (11) and (13) by ∃Ej dis-
charging (3)
(13) i : t = t By =Ii
(14) i : ∃x x = t From (13) by ∃Ii
(15) j : ψ(s) (6) From (14) and (12) by ∃Eji dis-
charging (1)
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Inversion
(Fij) i :
→j
x =
→j
y → j :x = y
(IPji) j :⊥ → i :⊥
(a) i :φ(x)→ j :ψ(i→x )
 |= j :¬ψ(i→x )→ i :¬φ(x)
under the assumption that φ(x) is a complete formula.
Label Formula L.A. G.A. Inference rule
(1) i : φ(x) (1) Assumption
(2) j : ψ(
i→
x ) (1) From (1) by BR(a)
(3) j : ¬ψ(i→x ) (3) Assumption
(4) j : ⊥ (3) (1) From (2) and (3) by ⊃ Ej
(5) i : ⊥ (1)(3) From (4) by BRIPji
(6) i : ¬φ(x) (3) From (5) by ⊥i discharging (1)
B Proof of the Soundness Theorem
Theorem 5 (Soundness). (Γ,Σ) `BR i :φ =⇒ Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
i:σ∈Σ σ ⊃ φ
The proof of the Soundness theorem makes use of the following lemma and
notation.
Lemma 1. Let a and a′ be two assignments that agree on the values assigned to
the arrow and free variables of φ. Then:
• M |= i :φ[a] if and only ifM |= i :φ[a′].
• m |= φ[ai] if and only if m |= φ[a′i].
The proof of Lemma 1 follows easily from the definition of satisfiability and
from the fact that a and a′ agree on the interpretation of all the variables of φ.
We write a(i : x = d) to denote the assignment obtained from a by setting
ai(x) = d and by letting both aj(
→i
x ) and aj(
i→
x ) undefined. Let t be an i-term,
m a local model of Li, and a an assignment admissible for t, we write m(t)[a] to
denote the interpretation of t in the local model (first-order interpretation)m under
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the assignment a. Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ and ∆ ⊆ Γ, we
define a|∆ to be the reduction of a strictly admissible for ∆:
(a|∆)i(x) =

ai(x) if x is a regular variable,
ai(x) if x is an arrow variable occurring in ∆,
undefined otherwise.
Given two assignments a and a′ defined over two sets of (regular and arrow) vari-
ables X and X ′, such that they agree on the set of variables X ∩X ′ they have in
common13, we define the assignment a+ a′ as follows:
(a+ a′)i(x) =

ai(x) = a
′
i(x) if both ai(x) and a
′
i(x) are defined,
ai(x) if only ai(x) is defined,
a′i(x) if only a
′
i(x) is defined.
Finally, for the sake of readability we write
∧
Σ as a shorthand for
∧
i:σ∈Σ σ.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5. The proof is by induction on the structure of the deriva-
tion of i :φ from (Γ,Σ). We first prove the theorem for (Γ,Σ) `BR i :φ with a one
step derivation (base case). Then we prove the theorem for (Γ,Σ) `BR i :φ with a
deduction Π of length n+1, by assuming that the theorem holds for all deductions
Π′ of length ≤ n and proving that it holds also for Π (inductive step). We prove
the inductive step by examining all the inference rules ρ used in the final step of
Π.
Base Case: If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ with a one step derivation, then either i : φ is
an assumption or a direct application of = Ii with n = 0. If i : φ is an
assumption, then we have to prove that e(i :φ) |= i :φ ⊃ φ. Let us assume
thatM |= e(i :φ)[a]. This means that ai is defined on all the arrow variables
of φ. Therefore, for every m ∈ Mi, m |= φ ⊃ φ[a] and the proof is done.
If i :φ is the consequence of an application of = Ii with n = 0, then it is of
the form i : t = t and t does not contain any arrow variable. This implies
that M |= i : t = t[a] for all models M and assignments a, which also
concludes the proof.
13Remember that two assignments can differ on the sets of arrow variables they provide an
assignment for.
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⊃ Ii If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ ⊃ ψ, and the last rule used is ⊃ Ii, then (Γ,Σ ∪ {i :
φ}) `BR i :φ ⊃ ψ also holds.
To prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ), letM be a BR-model and
a an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |= Γ, e(Σ)[a].
From the restriction R1, φ and ψ cannot contain existential arrow variables
(that is, arrow variables not contained in the premises). Therefore what
we have to prove is that M |= i : ∧Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)[a]. We do this by
distinguishing two cases:
i :φ is a local assumption. From the fact that (Γ,Σ∪ {i :φ}) `BR i :φ ⊃ ψ
is a deduction Π′ of length ≤ n we can apply the inductive hypothesis
and obtain that Γ, e(Σ ∪ {i : φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ. Since
i : φ does not contain any existential arrow variable (restriction R1),
thenM |= Γ, e(Σ ∪ {i : φ})[a]. Thus, from the inductive hypothesis
we have that M |= i : (∧Σ ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ[a]. Since (∧Σ ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ
is equivalent to
∧
Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ), and they contain the same arrow
variables, we can conclude that M |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ), and this
ends the proof.
i :φ is a global assumption. In this case from the inductive hypothesis we
obtain that Γ ∪ {i : φ}, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ψ. From the restriction
R3 we have that i : φ is a complete formula, and eitherM |= i : φ[a]
orM |= i :¬φ[a]. Let us consider the two cases separately. IfM |=
i : φ[a] we can use the inductive hypothesis to prove that M |= i :∧
Σ ⊃ ψ[a]. This, in turn, implies thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)[a]; if
M |= i :¬φ[a] thenM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)[a] from the definition of
first-order satisfiability, and this ends the proof.
⊃ Ei If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : ψ and the last rule used is ⊃ Ei, then from the inductive
hypothesis there are two formulae i :φ and i :φ ⊃ ψ such that Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR
i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ φ and Γ2, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ), with Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and
Σ = Σ1∪Σ2. We have to prove Γ1∪Γ1, e(Σ1∪Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
(Σ1∪Σ2) ⊃ ψ.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Since neither φ nor ψ contain existential arrow variables (restric-
tion R1) we have to prove thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ ψ[a] holds. Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1)
and a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restrictions of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1) and
Γ2, e(Σ2) respectively. We have thatM |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)] andM |=
Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)] hold. From the inductive hypothesis and the fact that
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neither φ nor ψ contain existential arrow variables (restriction R1) we have
thatM |= i :∧Σ1 ⊃ φ[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)] andM |= i :∧Σ2 ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)].
Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all formulae σ ∈
Σ1∪Σ2. Since a = a|Γ1,e(Σ1)+a|Γ2,e(Σ2), thenm |= φ[a] andm |= φ ⊃ ψ[a].
Thus m |= ψ[a] and from this we can conclude thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ ψ[a]
holds.
∧Ii (similar to ⊃ Ei). If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ ∧ ψ and the last rule used is ∧Ii, then
from the inductive hypothesis we know that Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φ and
Γ2, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ ψ, with Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2. We have
to prove that Γ1 ∪ Γ2, e(Σ1 ∪ Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
(Σ1 ∪ Σ2) ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ).
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Since neither φ nor ψ contain existential arrow variables (re-
striction R1) we have to prove thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ)[a] holds.
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) and a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be two restrictions of a strictly admissible for
Γ1, e(Σ1) and Γ2, e(Σ2), respectively. We have thatM |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)]
and M |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)] hold. From the inductive hypothesis and
the fact that neither φ nor ψ contain existential arrow variables (restriction
R1) we have that M |= i : ∧Σ1 ⊃ φ[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)] and M |= i : ∧Σ2 ⊃
ψ[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all
formulae σ ∈ Σ1 ∪ Σ2. Since a = a|Γ1,e(Σ1) + a|Γ2,e(Σ2), then m |= φ[a]
and m |= ψ[a]. Thus m |= φ ∧ ψ[a] and from this we can conclude that
M |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ)[a] holds.
∧Ei If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ and the last rule used is ∧Ei, then from the inductive
hypothesis there is a formula i :ψ such that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ)
and we have to prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φ.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. From the inductive hypothesis and and the fact that φ and ψ
do not contain existential arrow variables we can infer M |= i : ∧Σi ⊃
(φ ∧ ψ)[a], and from this and the notion of satisfiability inM we can infer
M |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ[a].
The proof for the elimination of the lefthand side conjunct is analogous.
∨Ii If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ ∨ ψ and the last rule used is ∨Ii, then from the inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φ holds and we have to
prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ).
74
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. From the inductive hypothesis, the fact that φ does not contain
existential arrow variables (restriction R1) we have that M |= i : ∧Σ ⊃
φ[a]. From the fact that ∨Ii cannot introduce existential arrow variables (re-
striction R2) we know that a is also admissible for i :ψ. Thus it is easy to
show that all local models inMi satisfy φ ∨ ψ under the assignment a and
therefore thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ)[a] holds.
The proof for the introduction of the lefthand side disjunct is analogous.
∨Eji If (Γ,Σ) `BR j : θ and the last rule used is ∨Eji, then there is a formula
i : φ ∨ ψ, and three pairs (Γi,Σi), i = 1, . . . , 3 with Γi ⊆ Γ ∪ Σ and
Σi ⊆ Γ ∪ Σ such that
(Γ1,Σ1) `BR i :φ ∨ ψ,
(Γ2, i :φ,Σ2) `BR j :θ,
(Γ3, i :ψ,Σ3) `BR j :θ.
We prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR j :
∧
Σ ⊃ θ by considering three different cases:
i :φ and i :ψ are both local assumptions. In this case i = j, Γ = Γ1∪Γ2∪
Γ3, Σ = Σ1∪Σ2∪Σ3, and from the inductive hypothesis we have that:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ), (60)
Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i :φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ θ, (61)
Γ3, e(Σ3 ∪ {i :ψ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ3 ∧ ψ) ⊃ θ. (62)
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m be an arbitrary local model inMi. We have to
prove that there is an extension a′ of a for i : θ such that if m |= σ[a′]
for all σ ∈ Σ then m |= θ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1).
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(60) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :φ ∨ ψ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ)[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (63)
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Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2).
ThenM |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Restriction R4 imposes that the exis-
tential arrow variables occurring in i :φ ∨ ψ do not occur in any of the
assumptions in Γ2 and Σ2. Thus we can extend a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assign-
ment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible for i : φ by adding to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assign-
ment of the existential arrow variables of i : φ according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1).
Then it is easy to show thatM |= Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i : φ})[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], and
from the inductive hypothesis (61) we can infer that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be
extended to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :θ such that
M |= i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (64)
With a similar construction we can use (62) to extend a|Γ3,e(Σ3) to an
assignment a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3) for i :θ such that
M |= i : (
∧
Σ3 ∧ ψ) ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)]. (65)
Let m be a local model inMi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ. Since
m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (63) to obtain m |=
φ∨ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Let us assume thatm |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)], then we can use
(64) to infer m |= θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Analogously if m |= ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)], then
we can use (65) to infer m |= θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)], and this ends the proof.
i :φ is a local assumption and i :ψ is a global assumption. If this is the case14,
then i = j, Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3, i :ψ is a complete
formula (restriction R3) and from the inductive hypothesis we have
that:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ), (66)
Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i :φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ θ, (67)
Γ3 ∪ {i :ψ}, e(Σ3) |=BR i :
∧
Σ3 ⊃ θ. (68)
We proceed as in the previous case by assuming that a is an assignment
strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |= Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m
be an arbitrary local model inMi. We have to prove that there is an
extension a′ of a for i : θ such that if m |= σ[a′] for all σ ∈ Σ then
m |= θ[a′].
14The case i :φ global assumption and i :ψ local assumption is analogous.
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Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1).
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(66) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :φ ∨ ψ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ)[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (69)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2).
With a proof equal to the one for the previous case we can extend
a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible for i : φ by adding
to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assignment of the existential arrow variables of i : φ
according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1). Then it is easy to show thatM |= Γ2, e(Σ2∪{i :
φ})[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], and from the inductive hypothesis (67) we can infer that
a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :θ such that
M |= i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (70)
With a similar construction we can use (68) to extend a|Γ3,e(Σ3) to an
assignment a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3) admissible also for i : ψ such that if M |= i :
ψ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)], then a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)
for i :θ such that
M |= i :Σ3 ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)]. (71)
Let m be a local model inMi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ. Since
m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (69) to obtain m |=
φ ∨ ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Let us assume that m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)], then we can
use (70) to infer m |= θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. If m |= ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)], we can use
the fact that i :ψ is a complete formula to inferM |= i :ψ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)].
Therefore, we can use (71) to inferm |= θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)], and this ends the
proof.
i :φ and i :ψ are both global assumptions. We consider the two cases i =
j and i 6= j separately.
If i = j, then Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3, i :φ and i :ψ are
complete formulae (restriction R3) and from the inductive hypothesis
we have that:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ), (72)
Γ2 ∪ {i :φ}, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ θ, (73)
Γ3 ∪ {i :ψ}, e(Σ3) |=BR i :
∧
Σ3 ⊃ θ. (74)
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We proceed as in the previous cases by assuming that a is an assign-
ment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |= Γ, e(Σ)[a], and m
is an arbitrary local model in Mi. We have to prove that there is an
extension a′ of a for i : θ such that if m |= σ[a′] for all σ ∈ Σ then
m |= θ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for {Γ1, e(Σ1)}.
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(72) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :φ ∨ ψ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ)[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (75)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for {Γ2, e(Σ2)}.
With a proof equal to the one for the previous cases we can extend
a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible also for i :φ by adding
to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assignment of the existential arrow variables of i :
phi according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1). Then it is easy to show that if M |= i :
φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)] we can use (67) to infer that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be extended to
an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :θ such that
M |= i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (76)
With a similar construction we can use (68) to extend a|Γ3,e(Σ3) to an
assignment a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3) admissible also for i : ψ such that if M |= i :
ψ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)], then a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)
for i :θ such that
M |= i :Σ3 ⊃ θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)]. (77)
Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ.
Since m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (75) to obtain
m |= φ ∨ ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Let us assume that m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Since
i : φ is a complete formula thenM |= i : φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Therefore we
can use (76) to infer m |= θ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. If m |= ψ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)] with i :ψ
complete formula, thenM |= i : ψ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)]. Therefore we can use
(77) to infer m |= θ[a¯|Γ3,e(Σ3)], and this ends the proof.
If i 6= j, the proof can be obtained as in the previous case, just taking
into account that Γ = Γ1 ∪ Σ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, and Σ = Σ2 ∪ Σ3 (that is,
the local assumptions of Σ1 become global due to the change of index
from i to j triggered by ∨Eji).
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⊥i If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : ¬φ and the last rule used is ⊥i, then we know that Γ, i :
φ,Σ `BR i :⊥).
To prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φ, let M be a BR-model and a an
assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |= Γ, e(Σ)[a]. From
the restriction R2, the arrow variables in i :φ must be contained in some of
the other assumptions used to infer i :⊥. If not, the rule ⊥i would introduce
new existential arrow variables by discharging i :¬φ. Thus we have to prove
thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ[a], and we do it by distinguishing two cases:
i :¬φ is a local assumption. In this case the inductive hypothesis enables
us to infer Γ, e(Σ ∪ {i : ¬φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ ∧ ¬φ) ⊃ ⊥. Since
all the arrow variables in i : ¬φ are also contained in Γ ∪ Σ, then
M |= Γ, e(Σ ∪ {i :¬φ})[a]. Thus all the local models m ∈Mi satisfy
i : (
∧
Σ ∧ ¬φ) ⊃ ⊥ which is classically equivalent to i : ∧Σ ⊃ φ.
ThusM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ[a].
i :¬φ is a global assumption. In this case i : ¬φ, and therefore i : φ, are
complete formulae. Moreover the inductive hypothesis enables us to
infer that Γ ∪ {i :¬φ}, e(Σ) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ ∧ ¬φ) ⊃ ⊥ holds.
Since i : φ is a complete formula, either M |= i : φ[a] or M |= i :
¬φ[a]. In the first caseM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ[a] is trivially satisfied. In
the second case, we can use the inductive hypothesis and obtain that
M |= i : (∧Σ ∧ ¬φ) ⊃ ⊥. Again, this is equivalent to say that
M |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ and this ends the proof.
∀Ii If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : ∀x φ and the last rule used is ∀Ii then, from the inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φ holds and we have to
prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ∀x φ.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. For every d ∈ domi we have thatM |= Γ, e(Σ)[a(i : x = d)].
This is guaranteed by the fact that x does not occur free in the formulae
in Γ and Σ with index i and that
→i
x and
i→
x do not occur in any formula
in Γ (restriction R5). From the inductive hypothesis and and the fact that
φ does not contain existential arrow variables (restriction R1) we can infer
M |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φ[a(i : x = d)]. Since x does not occur in Σ we can infer
(via first-order satisfiability) thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ ∀x φ[a].
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∀Ei If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ and the last rule used is ∀Ei, then from the inductive
hypothesis we have that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ∀x φ holds and we have to
prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φtx.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Then from the inductive hypothesis and the fact that ∀Ei can-
not be applied to formulae containing existential arrow variables (restriction
R1) we have thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ ∀x φ[a]. Since ∀Ei cannot introduce new
existential variables (restriction R2) a is admissible also for t. Let m be a
local model in Mi such that m |=
∧
Σ[a] (if not m |= Σ ⊃ φtx[a] trivially
holds), then m |= ∀x φ[a]. Let d = m(t)[a] be the object in domi assigned
to the interpretation of t in model m by a, then m |= Σ ⊃ φtx[a], which
implies thatM |= i :Σ ⊃ φtx[a].
∃Ii If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : ∃x φ and the last rule used is ∃Ii, then from the inductive
hypothesis we have that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ φtx holds and we have to
prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ∃x φ.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Then from the inductive hypothesis and the fact that ∃Ii can-
not be applied to formulae containing existential arrow variables (restriction
R1) we have thatM |= i :∧Σ ⊃ φtx[a], that is, m |= ∧Σ ⊃ φtx[a] for all
m ∈ Mi. But this easily implyM |= i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ∃xφ[a] from the definition
of first-order satisfiability.
∃Eji If (Γ,Σ) `BR j :ψ and the last rule used is ∃Eji, then there exist a formula
i : ∃x phi and two pairs pairs (Γi,Σi), i = 1, 2 with Γi ⊆ Γ ∪ Σ and
Σi ⊆ Γ ∪ Σ such that
(Γ1,Σ1) `BR i :∃x φ,
(Γ2, i :φ,Σ2) `BR j :ψ.
We prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR j :
∧
Σ ⊃ ψ by considering two different cases:
i :φ is a local assumption. In this case i = j, Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2,
and from the inductive hypothesis we have:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ ∃x φ), (78)
Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i :φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ. (79)
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Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m be an arbitrary local model inMi. We have to
prove that there is an extension a′ of a for i :ψ such that if m |= σ[a′]
for all σ ∈ Σ then m |= ψ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1).
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(78) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :∃x φ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ ∃x φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (80)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2).
ThenM |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Restriction R4 imposes that the ex-
istential arrow variables occurring in i : ∃x φ do not occur in any
of the assumptions in Γ2 and Σ2. Thus we can extend a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to
an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible for i : φ by adding to a|Γ2,e(Σ2)
the assignment of the existential arrow variables of i : ∃x φ accord-
ing to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1). Then it is easy to show that M |= Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i :
φ})[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], and from the inductive hypothesis (79) we can infer
that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :ψ such
that
M |= i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (81)
Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ.
Since m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (80) to obtain
m |= ∃xφ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Let d = m(t)[a]. Thus, m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)(i :
x = d)]. From the restriction R6 we know that x does not occur
free in any of the assumptions of Γ and Σ and in i : ψ. Therefore
M |= Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i : φ})[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)], and we can use the
inductive hypothesis as in (81) to obtain M |= i : (∧Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃
ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)]. m |= Σ2[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)], from the fact
that it satisfies all the formulae in Σ under the assignment a, and that
[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)] is built from a restriction of a. Analogously
m |= φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)], by construction of a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d).
Thus m |= ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)], and the proof is done.
i : φ is a global assumption. Here we distinguish two cases: i = j and i 6= j.
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If i = j, then Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2, i : φ is a complete formula
(restriction R3) and from the inductive hypothesis we have:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ ∃x φ), (82)
Γ2 ∪ {i :φ}, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ ψ. (83)
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m be an arbitrary local model inMi. We have to prove
that there is an extension a′ of a for i :ψ such that if m |= σ[a′] for all σ ∈ Σ
then m |= ψ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1). Then
M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis (82) a|Γ1,e(Σ1)
can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible for i :∃x φ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ ∃x φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (84)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2). Then
M |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Restriction R4 imposes that the existential ar-
row variables occurring in i :∃x φ do not occur in any of the assumptions in
Γ2 and Σ2. Thus we can extend a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admis-
sible for i :φ by adding to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assignment of the existential arrow
variables of i : ∃x φ according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1). Then it is easy to show that if
M |= i :φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], then we can use the inductive hypothesis (83) to infer
that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :ψ such that
M |= i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (85)
Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ. Since
m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (84) to obtain m |=
∃xφ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Let d = m(t)[a]. Thus, m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)(i : x = d)].
From the restriction R6 we know that x does not occur free in any of the
assumptions of Γ and Σ and in i : ψ. Thus M |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :
x = d)]. From the way a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d) is built, we know that m |=
φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)], and from the fact that i :φ is a complete formula we
can obtainM |= φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)]. Thus we can repeat the reasoning
steps to infer (85) to obtainM |= i :∧Σ2 ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)].
m |= Σ2[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)], from the fact that it satisfies all the formulae
in Σ under the assignment a, and that [a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)] is built from a
restriction of a. Thus m |= ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)], and this ends the proof.
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If i 6= j, the proof can be obtained as in the previous case, just taking into
account that Γ = Γ1∪Σ1∪Γ2, and Σ = Σ2 (that is, the local assumptions of
Σ1 become global due to the change of index from i to j triggered by ∃Eji).
=Ii If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : t = t and the last rule used is = Ii, then from the inductive
hypothesis there are n formulae i :φ1, . . . , i :φn such that Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :∧
Σ1 ⊃ φ1, . . . ,Γn, e(Σn) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ φn, with Γ =
⋃
1≤k≤n Γk and
Σ =
⋃
1≤k≤n Σk.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Let a|Γk,e(Σk) be the restrictions of a strictly admissible for
Γk, e(Σk). Since i : φk cannot contain existential arrow variables, then
M |= i : ∧Σk ⊃ φk[a|Γk,e(Σk)]. Thus each a|Γk,e(Σk) is admissible for
i : φk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and since a = (a|Γ1,e(Σ1)+, . . . ,+a|Γn,e(Σn), we
also have that a|Γk,e(Σk) is admissible for i :φk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Since =Ii
cannot introduce new existential arrow variables (restriction R2) a is admis-
sible also for i : t = t. ThusM |= i : t = t[a] from first-order satisfiability
of =.
=Ei If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φux and the last rule used is = Ii, then from the induc-
tive hypothesis there are two formulae i : φtx and i : t = u such that
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ φtx, Γ2, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ t = u, Γ = Γ1 ∪Γ2
and Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such that M |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a]. Since = Ei cannot introduce new arrow variables (restriction
R2), then we have to prove that M |= i : ∧Σ ⊃ φux[a]. Let a|Γk,e(Σk)
be the restrictions of a strictly admissible for Γk, e(Σk), k = 1, 2. Then
M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)] and M |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. From the in-
ductive hypothesis and restriction R1 we can obtain thatM |= i :∧Σ1 ⊃
φtx[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)] and M |= i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ t = u[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Let m ∈ Mi be a
local model which satisfies Σ under the assignment a. Using the inductive
hypothesis and the fact that a = a|Γ1,e(Σ1) + a|Γ2,e(Σ2) we can obtain that
m |= φtx[a] and m |= t = u[a]. Then m |= φux[a] from the definition of
first-order satisfiability.
i→Iij If (Γ,Σ) `BR j : i→x = y and the last rule used is i→Iij , then i 6= j, and
Σ = ∅15. Thus, we have to show that Γ |=BR j : i→x = y.
15Remember that the application of a b-rule makes all the local assumption become global.
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From the shape of the i→Iij rule we know that there is a formula i :x =
→j
y
and two sets Γ1,Σ1 with Γ = Γ1 ∪Σ1 such that Γ1,Σ1 `BR i :x = →jy . Thus
from the inductive hypothesis we know that Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ (x =
→j
y ).
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ such thatM |= Γ[a]. We
have to prove that there is an extension a′ of a for j :
i→
x = y such that
M |= j : i→x = y. From M |= Γ[a] we have that M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a],
and from the inductive hypothesis and the fact that i→Iij cannot be applied
to formulae containing existential arrow variables (restriction R1) we also
have thatM |=:∧Σ1 ⊃ (x = →jy )[a]. Again fromM |= Γ[a] we have that
M |= i : x = →jy [a]. This implies that ai(x) = ai(→jy ). From restriction
R2 we know that
i→
x is an existential variable in j :
i→
x = y. Thus aj(
i→
x ) is
undefined, and we can obtain a new assignment a′ by adding to a the value
a′j(
i→
x ) = aj(y). We have to show that (a′i(x), a
′
j(
i→
x )) ∈ rij . This follows
from the fact that (a′i(x), a
′
j(
i→
x )) = (ai(x) = aj(y)) = (ai(
→j
y ), aj(y)),
and from the fact that (ai(
→j
y ), aj(y)) ∈ rij because of the fact that a is an
assignment (see Definition 4). Since a′j(
i→
x ) = a′j(y) we have that m |= j :
i→
x = y[a′] and this ends the proof.
→iIij The proof is analogous to the one of i→Iij .
BR: If (Γ,Σ) `BR i : φ and the last rule used is BR, then Σ = ∅ because the
application of a b-rule makes all the local assumptions become global. Thus
we have to prove that Γ |=BR i :φ. From the inductive hypothesis we know
that there are n formulae i1 : φ1, . . . , in : φn such that Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i1 :∧
Σ1 ⊃ φ1, . . . ,Γn, e(Σn) |=BR in :
∧
Σn ⊃ φn with Γk ⊆ Γ and Σk ⊆ Γ
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ such thatM |= Γ[a]. Since
Σk ⊆ Γ, then a is admissible for all the variables in Σk, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Let a|Γk,e(Σk) be the restrictions of a strictly admissible for Γk, e(Σk). Then,
M |= Γk, e(Σk)[a|Γk,e(Σk)] holds. From the restriction R1 which states that
each ik : φk cannot contain existential arrow variables, and the inductive
hypothesis, we infer thatM |= ik :
∧
Σk ⊃ φk[a|Γk,e(Σk)]. SinceM |= Γ
and Σk ⊆ Γ we have that M |= ik : φk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. From the
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definition of satisfiability of a bridge rule we know that a can be extended
to an assignment a′ such thatM |= i :φ[a′], and this ends the proof.
Cutji If (Γ,Σ) `BR i :ψ and the last rule used is Cutji, then there exists a formula
j :φ and two pairs (Γk,Σk), k = 1, 2 with Γk ⊆ Γ∪Σ and Σk ⊆ Γ∪Σ such
that
(Γ1,Σ1) `BR j :φ,
(Γ2, j :φ,Σ2) `BR i :ψ.
We prove that Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
Σ ⊃ ψ by considering two different cases:
j :φ is a local assumption. In this case i = j, Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2,
and from the inductive hypothesis we have:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ φ, (86)
Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i :φ}) |=BR i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ. (87)
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m be an arbitrary local model inMi. We have to
prove that there is an extension a′ of a for i :ψ such that if m |= σ[a′]
for all σ ∈ Σ then m |= ψ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1).
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(86) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :φ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (88)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2).
ThenM |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Restriction R4 imposes that the ex-
istential arrow variables occurring in i : φ do not occur in any of the
assumptions in Γ2 and Σ2. Thus we can extend a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assign-
ment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible for i : φ by adding to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assign-
ment of the existential arrow variables of i : φ according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1).
Then it is easy to show thatM |= Γ2, e(Σ2 ∪ {i : φ})[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], and
from the inductive hypothesis (87) we can infer that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be
extended to an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :ψ such that
M |= i : (
∧
Σ2 ∧ φ) ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (89)
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Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ.
Since m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (88) to obtain
m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. By construction we also have thatm |= φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]
and m |= Σ2[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Thus m |= ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)] and this ends the
proof.
j :φ is a global assumption. Here we distinguish two cases: i = j and i 6=
j.
If i = j, then Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2, Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2, i :φ is a complete formula
(restriction R3) and from the inductive hypothesis we have:
Γ1, e(Σ1) |=BR i :
∧
Σ1 ⊃ φ, (90)
Γ2 ∪ {i :φ}, e(Σ2) |=BR i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ ψ. (91)
Let a be an assignment strictly admissible for Γ, e(Σ) such thatM |=
Γ, e(Σ)[a], and let m be an arbitrary local model in Mi. We have to
prove that there is an extension a′ of a for i :ψ such that if m |= σ[a′]
for all σ ∈ Σ then m |= ψ[a′].
Let a|Γ1,e(Σ1) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ1, e(Σ1).
Then M |= Γ1, e(Σ1)[a|Γ1,e(Σ1)], and from the inductive hypothesis
(90) a|Γ1,e(Σ1) can be extended to an assignment a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1) admissible
for i :φ such that
M |= i :Σ1 ⊃ φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. (92)
Let a|Γ2,e(Σ2) be the restriction of a strictly admissible for Γ2, e(Σ2).
ThenM |= Γ2, e(Σ2)[a|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. Restriction R4 imposes that the ex-
istential arrow variables occurring in i :∃x φ do not occur in any of the
assumptions in Γ2 and Σ2. Thus we can extend a|Γ2,e(Σ2) to an assign-
ment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) admissible for i : φ by adding to a|Γ2,e(Σ2) the assign-
ment of the existential arrow variables of i : φ according to a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1).
Then it is easy to show that ifM |= i : φ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)], then we can use
the inductive hypothesis (91) to infer that a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) can be extended to
an assignment a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2) for i :ψ such that
M |= i :
∧
Σ2 ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)]. (93)
Let m be a local model in Mi such that m |= σ[a] for all σ ∈ Σ.
Since m satisfies all the formulae in Σ1, then we can use (92) to obtain
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m |= φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Since φ is a complete formula, we have thatM |=
i : φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. From the way a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d) is built, we know
thatM |= i :φ[a¯|Γ1,e(Σ1)]. Thus we can apply the inductive hypothesis
to infer (93) to obtainM |= i :∧Σ2 ⊃ ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)].
m |= Σ2[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)], from the fact that it satisfies all the
formulae in Σ under the assignment a, and that [a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i : x = d)]
is built from a restriction of a. Thus m |= ψ[a¯|Γ2,e(Σ2)(i :x = d)], and
this ends the proof.
If i 6= j, the proof can be obtained as in the previous case, just taking
into account that Γ = Γ1 ∪ Σ1 ∪ Γ2, and Σ = Σ2 (that is, the local
assumptions of Σ1 become global due to the change of index from j
to i triggered by Cutji).

C Proof of the Completeness Theorem
Theorem 6 (Completeness). Γ, e(Σ) |=BR i :
∧
i:σ∈Σ σ ⊃ φ =⇒ (Γ,Σ) `BR i :φ
The contrapositive will be proved: it will be shown that if (Γ,Σ) 6`BR i : φ
then there exists a BR-model Mc and an assignment a such that M |= Γ[a],
M |= e(Σ)[a] butM 6|= i :∧i:σ∈Σ σ ⊃ φ[a]. The technique we use is based on the
construction of canonical modelMc using the method of models constructed from
constants originally due to Henkin [39] (see also [16]). This method is based on
the ability of constructing a canonical modelsMc starting from maximal consis-
tent sets of formulae and an appropriate set of constants (or existential witnesses).
The situation in DFOL is more complex than the one of FOL due to the following
three reasons: first, the presence of sets of formulas belonging to different lan-
guages; second, the presence of partial knowledge; and finally, the presence of
arrow variables.
The generalisation of the Henkin technique to the case of DFOL is composed
by the following steps:
1. We generalise the notion of consistency to k-consistency (Definitions 14);
2. We introduce the operators cl and ⊗i (Definitions 15 and 16) to be able to
deal with sets of sets of formulas and we show some relevant properties of
these operators (Lemma 2);
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3. We modify the Henkin technique to extend a consistent set Γ of DFOL
formulas to a set with existential witnesses (Lemma 3);
4. We introduce the notion of k-saturated set of formulas (Definition 18) and
show how to saturate a k-consistent set of formulas (Lemma 5);
5. We define the canonical modelMc as a compatibility relation over sets of
(local) models satisfying maximal-k-consistent sets of formulas (Definition
19);
6. We show thatMc is a BR-model (Lemma 7).
As already observed in [28], the first step in proving completeness for logical
systems whose formulas are scattered among different languages is the introduc-
tion of specific notions of consistency and maximal consistency, which generalise
the analogous concepts given in [16].
Definition 14 (k-consistency). Γ is k-consistent if Γ 6`BR k :⊥.
This generalisation is needed as a set of DFOL formulas Γ can be locally
inconsistent with respect to an index i without being inconsistent with respect to
some different index j, that is, Γ `BR i : ⊥ but Γ 6`BR j : ⊥. Thus, we have to
prove that every k-consistent set of formulas Γ of DFOL has a (canonical) model,
which associates a non empty set Mk of local models to the language Lk.
The second step in proving completeness for DFOL is to be able to work with
sets of labelled formulas. In fact the scattering of the system in different lan-
guages implies that we have to build a canonical model structured as a family
M0,M1, . . . of sets of interrelated (local) models spanning over different lan-
guages. From now on we use Γi to denote a set of formulas in Li, and Γi to
denote a (finite or infinite) set {Γ0i ,Γ1i , . . . ,Γni , . . .} of sets of formulas in Li. We
instead use Γ to denote a family {Γ0,Γ1, . . .} of sets Γi of sets of formulas, one
for each i in I . The closure of a set Γi of formulas in Li, denoted as cl(Γi), is
defined as the set of formulas derivable from Γi using the deduction rules of first-
order logic in the context i, and considering the arrow variables occurring in Γi as
constants. The closure of a set Γ is instead defined as the set containing all (and
only) the formulas i :φ that belong to the deductive closure cl(Γi) of all Γi ∈ Γi,
for all i ∈ I . Formally,
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Definition 15 (Closure of Γ). Let Γ = {Γ0,Γ1, . . .} be a family of sets of sets of
formulas in {L0, L1, . . .}. The closure of Γ, in symbols cl(Γ), is defined as:
cl(Γ) =
⋃
i∈I
{
i :φ
∣∣∣∣∣ φ ∈
(⋂
Γ∈Γi
cl(Γ)
)}
We say that i : φ is derivable from Γ iff i : φ is derivable from cl(Γ). Anal-
ogously, we say that Γ is k-consistent, iff cl(Γ) is k-consistent. We also write
Γ `BR i :φ as a shorthand for cl(Γ) `BR i :φ.
Note that the computation of cl(Γ) does not take into account any b-rule in
ML(BR) but only the (local) i-rules for first-order logic with equality of the differ-
ent knowledge sources. Instead the deduction of formulas from cl(Γ) is performed
taking into account the entire deductive calculus of ML(BR).
Given a set of arrow variables AV =
⋃
i∈I AVi, we define the closure of Γ
w.r.t. AV as before but considering the arrow variables in AV like regular first-
order terms. We define the notions of derivability from Γ w.r.t. AV and of k-
consistency of Γ w.r.t. AV , accordingly.
We illustrate the difference between the closure of Γ and the closure of Γ w.r.t.
AV by means of an example.
Example 10. Let Γ be a set such that each Γi ∈ Γi satisfies the fact that a deduc-
tion Γi, x =
→
z ` ψ involving only formulas in i exists. If there is no other way of
proving ψ from all Γi, then ψ 6∈ cl(Γ). This holds because an additional formula
x =
→
z outside Γi is used to infer it. If
→
z ∈ AV and we treat →z as a first-order
regular term, then ∃x.x = →z becomes a regular first-order (valid) formula and
therefore we can apply the ∃ elimination rule to obtain a deduction of ψ from Γi
(for all i) as follows:
Γi, [x =
→
z ]
Π
ψ ∃x.x = →z
ψ
∃Eii
Thus, while ψ does not belong to the closure of Γ it belongs to the closure of Γ
w.r.t. AV .
To be able to generalise the Henkin technique to DFOL, where we need to
manipulate sets of sets of formulas Γ, we introduce an operator ⊗i, that we use to
perform a kind of cross product between sets of formulas.
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Definition 16 (⊗i). Let Σi be a set of formulas in Li. Γ′ = Γ⊗i Σi is defined as:
Γ′ =
{
Γ′j = Γj for all j 6= i
Γ′i = {Γ ∪ {σ} | Γ ∈ Γi, σ ∈ Σi}
Example 11. Let Γ = {Γ1,Γ2} where:
• Γ1 = {{1:A}}
• Γ2 = {{2:B, 2:C}, {2:¬C}}
and let Σ2 = {2:D, 2:E}. The set Γ′ = Γ⊗2 Σ2 is built as follows:
• Γ′1 = Γ1 = {{1:A}}
• Γ′2 = {{2 :B, 2 :C, 2 :D}, {2 :¬C, 2 :D}, {2 :B, 2 :C, 2 :E}, {2 :¬C, 2 :
E}}
Lemma 2. Let {φ1, . . . , φn} be a set of formulas ofLi. Γ⊗i{φ1, . . . , φn} `BR j :ψ
if and only if cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn `BR j :ψ.
Proof. From the notion of derivability from Γ the statement of the theorem can be
reformulated in cl(Γ⊗i {φ1, . . . , φn}) `BR j :ψ if and only if cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨
φn `BR j :ψ. In the proof we use Φ to denote the set of Li-formulas {φ1, . . . , φn}.
“IF” DIRECTION. Assume that cl(Γ), i : φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn `BR j :ψ with a proof Π,
and let j1 :ψ1, . . . , jm :ψm be the undischarged assumptions of Π. We show that
all the undischarged assumptions of Π can be derived from cl(Γ⊗i {φ1, . . . , φn}).
For each undischarged assumption jk :ψk, k = 1, . . . ,m, we have to consider
two cases: (a) ik :ψk ∈ cl(Γ), and (b) ik :ψk = i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn:
(a) If ik : ψk ∈ cl(Γ) then we have to consider two separate cases: if ik 6= i
then ik :ψk ∈ cl(Γ) ⊗i Φ since cl(Γ) and cl(Γ ⊗i Φ) contain the same set of
formulas with index j 6= i; if ik = i it is easy to see from the definition of the
operator cl(.) that
if ψk ∈
⋂
Γi∈Γi
cl(Γi), then ψk ∈
⋂
Γi∈Γi
⋂
φl∈Φ
cl(Γi ∪ φl)
This is true because derivability in FOL (and therefore the FOL deductive
closure of a set of Li-formulas) is monotone.
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(b) If ik : ψk = i : φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn, then we can easily see that i : φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn
is derivable, via ∨Ii, from all the sets Γi ∪ φl (with Γi ∈ Γi and φl ∈ Φ).
Therefore, from the definition of cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn ∈ cl(Γ⊗i Φ).
Since all the undischarged assumptions j1 : ψ1, . . . , jm : ψm of Π are derivable
from the set cl(Γ ⊗i Φ) we can easily extend Π to build a deduction of i :ψ from
Γ⊗i Φ.
“ONLY IF” DIRECTION. Assume that Γ ⊗i Φ `BR j : ψ with a proof Π, and
let j1 : ψ1, . . . , jm : ψm be the undischarged assumptions of Π. Then all j1 :
ψ1, . . . , jm :ψm belong to cl(Γ ⊗i Φ) and we show that they can be derived from
cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn.
For each undischarged assumption jk :ψk, k = 1, . . . ,m, we have to consider
two cases: (a) ik 6= i and (b) ik = i.
(a) Assume that ik 6= i. From the definition of⊗i and the fact that it only modifies
the set Γi, and from the definition of closure (cl(.)) over a set Γi of FOL
formulas we can easily see that
ik :ψk ∈ cl(Γ⊗i Φ) if and only if ψk ∈
⋂
Γik∈Γik
cl(Γik)
Thus, since ik :ψk ∈ cl(Γ⊗i Φ), we can prove that ψk ∈ cl(Γ).
(b) Assume that ik = i. From the definition of ⊗i and cl(.) we have that
ik :ψk ∈ cl(Γ⊗i Φ) if and only if ψk ∈
⋂
Γi∈Γi
⋂
φl∈Φ
cl(Γi ∪ φl)
This implies that for all Γi ∈ Γi, ψk is derivable from all Γi∪φl for all φl ∈ Φ
with a first-order deduction. We can therefore apply ∨Eii to obtain that ik :ψk
is derivable from Γi, i : φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn, for all Γi ∈ Γi. Note that Restriction
R4 is satisfied as i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn does not contain existential arrow variables
(as it does not depend upon any assumption), and Restriction R3 is satisfied
as the derivation of ψk from each of the Γi ∪ φl is local (and therefore we can
apply ∨Eii and discharge the different φl). Therefore we can easily build a
deduction Πk of ψk from cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn.
Since all the undischarged assumptions j1 :ψ1, . . . , jm :ψm of Π are derivable
from the set cl(Γ), i :φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn we can build a deduction of i :ψ from cl(Γ), i :
φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn and this ends the proof.
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The proof of completeness proceeds with the construction of the canonical
modelMc using the method of models constructed from constants (see [39, 16]).
Roughly speaking the Henkin approach is based on two fundamental ideas: first,
for each existential sentence ∃x φ(x) in the language, one adds a new constant c,
the so-called existential witness, to the language and inserts an axiom ∃x φ(x) ⊃
φ(c) to the theory; second, the canonical model is built using equivalence classes
of existential witnesses as domain elements. Differently from the classical proof
for first-order logic, the presence of partial knowledge implies that a DFOL for-
mula i : ∃xφ(x) does not necessarily entail a formula i : φ(c) for some c (unless
φ is a complete formula). This fact forces us to modify the original technique of
existential witnesses as follows: we start from a k-consistent set of formulas Γ
and examine all the formulas j :φ(x) in {Li} with one free variable; if j :∃xφ(x)
is a complete formula then we add the existential witness j :φ(c) as usual, while if
it is a “regular” (that is, non-complete) formula we add an infinite set of witnesses
j :φ(c1), . . . , j :φ(cn), . . ., one for each possible interpretation in Mi (Lemma 3).
We first extend the definition of existential witness to the case of multiple
languages.
Definition 17 (Existential Witness). Let Γ be a set {Γ0,Γ1, . . .} of formulas in
{Li} = {L0, L1, . . .} and let C = {C0, C1, . . .} be a set of constant symbols such
that each Ci is a set of constants of Li. We say that C is a set of witnesses for
Γ in {Li} iff for every formula i : φ(x) with exactly one free variable x in Li the
following holds:
• if i : φ(x) is a complete formula, then there is a constant c ∈ Ci such that
Γ `BR i :∃φ(x) ⊃ φ(c);
• if i :φ(x) is a non complete formula, then there is a set of constants c1, . . . , ck, . . . ∈
Ci such that Γi `BR i :∃φ(x) ⊃ φ(ci) for each Γi ∈ Γi.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a k-consistent set of sentences of {Li}. Let C be a set {Ci}
of new constant symbols of power |C| =‖ {Li} ‖, and let {Li ∪ Ci} be the family
of languages defined as the simple expansion of each Li formed by adding {Ci}.
Then Γ can be extended to a k-consistent set of set of sentences Γ∗ in {Li ∪ Ci}
which has C as a set of witnesses in {Li ∪ Ci}.
Proof. Let
i1 :φ1(x), i2 :φ2(x), i3 :φ3(x), . . .
be an enumeration of all the formulas in {Li} that contain exactly one free vari-
able x. Let C be an infinitely enumerable set of variables. We “split” C into an
enumerable sequence of disjoint sets W , U1, U2, U3, . . . as follows
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W = {w1, w2, w3, . . .}
U1 = {u11, u12, u13, . . .}
U2 = {u21, u22, u23, . . .}
U3 = {u31, u32, u33, . . .}
. . .
such that V = W ∪U1 ∪U2 ∪U3 ∪ . . . . We define an infinite sequence Γ0,Γ1, . . .
as follows:
1. Γ0 is such that Γ0i = {Γi} for all i ∈ I .
2. Γn with n = m+ 1 is built according to the following rules:
• if Γm 6`BR in : ∃y.y = →z for some arrow variable →z that occurs in
φn(x), then Γn = Γm;
• otherwise Γn is defined as follows:
(a) if in :φn(x) is a complete formula then
Γn = Γm ⊗in {∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(wn)}
(b) if in :φn(x) is not a complete formula then
Γn = Γm ⊗in {∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(u) | u ∈ Un}
Each Γn has a set of witnesses in a subset of V by construction. We have to
show that each Γn is k-consistent. We prove this by induction on n.
• Base Case (n = 0).
From the definition of Γ0 we can immediately see that cl(Γ0) ` i :φ if and
only if Γ ` i : φ, for all formulas i : φ. Therefore the k-consistency of Γ0
follows immediately from the k-consistency of Γ.
• Inductive step.
Let us assume that Γn−1 is k-consistent. We have to prove that Γn is k-
consistent as well. If Γn = Γn−1, then the theorem is trivially true. Let
us examine the case Γn 6= Γn−1. In this case, the definition of Γn depends
upon whether the formula in :φn in the enumeration is complete or not. We
assume, by contradiction, that Γn is not k-consistent and we split the proof
in two different cases depending on whether in :φn is a complete formula or
not.
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1. If in :φn is complete, then we can use Lemma 2 and say that there is a
deduction Π of k :⊥ from cl(Γn−1), in :∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(wn).
Π must contain an un-discharged assumption of the form in :∃xφn(x) ⊃
φn(wn). Otherwise the same proof Π is obtainable from cl(Γn−1),
which violates the assumption of k-consistency of cl(Γn−1). Therefore
we can build the following deduction from cl(Γn−1):
cl(Γn−1)
Π1
in :∃z.(∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(z))
cl(Γn−1) [in :∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(wn)]
Π
k :⊥
k :⊥ ∃E=
Remember that cl(Γn−1) `BR in :∃y.y = →z for all the arrow variables
occurring in φn(x). Under this hypothesis the existence of the deduc-
tion Π1 above is guaranteed. Therefore we have shown a deduction of
k :⊥ from cl(Γn−1) which contradicts the inductive hypothesis.
2. If in : φn is not complete we can prove that if cl(Γn) `BR i : φ, then
cl(Γn−1) `BR i : φ. Let us assume that cl(Γn) `BR i : φ with a proof
Π and that j :ψ is one of the undischarged assumptions of Π. We will
prove that we can infer all the undischarged assumptions j : ψ of Π
from cl(Γn−1). This will immediately prove that Π can be extended to
a new proof Π′ of i :φ from cl(Γn−1).
Let j : ψ ∈ cl(Γn). If j 6= in, then j : ψ ∈ cl(Γn−1) and the proof
is done. If j = in, then the definition of cl(.) says that for all Γnin ∈
Γnin , Γ
n
in locally entails ψ. From the definition of Γ
n we know that
all Γnin are of the form Γ
n−1
in
∪ {∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(u)}. Therefore we
have that for all Γn−1in ∈ Γn−1 there are an infinite number of proofs
Γn−1in ,∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(u) ` ψ.
Since all the variables u are new, and cl(Γn−1) `BR in :∃y.y = →z for
all the arrow variables possibly occurring in φn(x), then, in defining
cl(Γn−1) we can treat all arrow variables
→
z in φn as terms. Therefore
for all Γn−1in ∈ Γn−1in the following proof of in :ψ holds:
in :∃z.(∃xφn(x) ⊃ φn(z))
Γn−1in [∃x.φn(x) ⊃ φn(u)]
Πu
in :ψ
in :ψ
∃E
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and in :ψ ∈ cl(Γn−1).
Let Γ∗ be the upper-bound of the sequence Γ0,Γ1, . . .. From the proof above
we can conclude that Γ∗ is k-consistent. This terminates the proof.
Lemma 4. For all n ≥ 0, consider the closure of Γn w.r.t. the set of variables →v
that occur in φn+1(x) such that Γn `BR in+1 :∃y.y = →z . Γn is such that if z 6∈ C,
then Γn `BR i :∃y.→z = y if and only if Γ `BR i :∃y.→z = y;
Proof. The proof is by induction on n and is similar to the one for Lemma 3.
The third step in our proof is the construction of saturated sets of formulas that
will determine the local models m that belong to the canonical model.
Definition 18 (k-saturated). Given a set of formulas Γ we say that Γ is k-saturated
if for all formulas k : φ in {Lk} at least one between k : φ and k :¬φ belongs to
Γ. Given a set of set of formulas Γ we say that Γ is k-saturated if for all formulas
k :φ in {Lk} at least one between k :φ and k :¬φ belongs to each Γk ∈ Γ in Lk.
Lemma 5. Γ∗ can be extended to a k-saturated set Σ∗.
Proof. Let
i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, i3 :φ3, . . .
be a new enumeration of the formula in the original languages in {Li} extended
with the variables in C and the corresponding extended variables (that is, if c ∈ C
we consider here also formulas containing arrow variables of the form
→j
c and
j→
c ).
We define an infinite sequence of sets of sets of formulas Σ0,Σ1, . . . as follows:
1. Σ0 = Γ∗;
2. Σn, with n = m+ 1 is defined as follows:
(a) if Σm 6`BR in : ∃y.y = →z for some arrow variable →z that occurs in
φn(x), then Σn = Σm; otherwise,
(b) if in :φn is a complete formula then:
Σn =
{
Σm ⊗in {φn} if Σm ⊗in {φn} is k-consistent
Σm ⊗in {¬φn} otherwise
(c) if in :φn is not a complete formula then
Σn = Σm ⊗in {φn,¬φn}
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Let Σ∗ be the upper-bound of the sequence Σ0,Σ1, . . .. Σ∗ is k-saturated by
construction.
Lemma 6. Σ∗ is k-consistent.
Proof. We prove that for each n ≥ 0, Σn is k-consistent by induction on n.
• Base Case (n = 0).
Σ0 is k-consistent because of the k-consistency of Γ∗.
• Inductive Step.
Suppose that Σn−1 is k-consistent, and let us prove that Σn is k-consistent
too. If Σn = Σn−1, then the proof is done. As usual, we split the proof in
two parts, depending on whether the n-th formula in :φn in the enumeration
is complete or not.
1. If in :φn is complete then the only possibility for having Σn k-inconsistent
is that both Σn−1 ⊗in φn and Σn−1 ⊗in ¬φn are k-inconsistent. From
the Lemma 2 we can deduce that k :⊥ is derivable both from cl(Σn−1), in :
φn and from cl(Σn−1), in :¬φn. Then, with an application of ∨E= we
have that k :⊥ is derivable from cl(Σn−1). This contradicts the fact
that Σn−1 is k-consistent.
2. If in : φn is not complete then, Σn = Σn−1 ⊗in {φn,¬φn}. Using
Lemma 2, Σn `BR k :⊥ iff cl(Σn−1), in : φn ∨ ¬φn `BR k :⊥. Since
cl(Σn−1) `BR in : ∃y.y = →z for all the arrow variables →z that occur
in φn, then cl(Σn−1) `BR in :φn ∨ ¬φn, and cl(Σn−1) `BR k :⊥ holds
which contradicts the fact that Σn−1 is k-consistent.
The final step in the proof is the definition of the canonical model, and the
proof that this canonical model is a BR-model.
Definition 19 (Canonical Model). The canonical model Mc = 〈{Sci }, {rcij}〉 is
defined as follows.
Domains: Let C be the set of existential witnesses introduced in the construc-
tion of Γ∗. Let
→
Ci be the set of the additional arrow variables →c such that
∃x.x = →c belongs to the intersection ⋂Σ∗i of all Σi in Σ∗i . For two vari-
ables c1, c2 ∈ C ∪
→
Ci we define:
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c1 ∼i c2 if and only if c1 = c2 ∈
⋂
Σ∗i .
Since Σ∗ is saturated w.r.t. complete formulas, we have that each ∼i is an
equivalence relation on C ∪
→
Ci. For each c ∈ C ∪
→
Ci, let
[c]i = {c ∈ C ∪
→
Ci | c ∼i c′}
be the equivalence class of c. Similarly to the usual proof of completeness
for first-order logic, we propose to construct a model Mc that associates
to each language Li the domain domci of all the equivalence classes [c]i.
Formally,
domci = {[c]i | c ∈ C ∪
→
Ci}
Local models: For each i ∈ I each element Σ ∈ Σ∗i is saturated. That is, for
each i-formula with arrow variables in
→
C , at least one between φ and ¬φ
is in Σ. In the general case Σ may be inconsistent (this happens when both
φ and ¬φ belong to Σ), but if this is not the case, then Σ automatically
determines a local interpretation of Li over domci . Therefore we define
Sci = {Σ ∈ Σ∗i |Σ is i-consistent}.
Domain relations: For each pair i 6= j ∈ I , the domain relation rcij ⊆ domci ×
domcj is defined as
rij = {〈[c][i→c ] | if i→c ∈
→
Cj〉} ∪ {〈[→jc ][c] | if →jc ∈
→
Ci〉}
Let us prove thatMc is a model which satisfies the bridge rules BR.
Lemma 7. Mc is a BR-model.
Proof. We have to prove thatMc is not empty, that is, that at least one of the Sci
is not empty, and that is satisfies the bridge rules BR.
Not emptiness: Since Σ∗ is k-consistent there is an element Σ ∈ Σ∗k which is
consistent. Therefore Sck is not empty.
Satisfiability of BR: We consider the simple case of i : φ(x) → j : ψ(i→x ). The
proof for more complex interpretation constraints is analogous.
Suppose thatMc |= i : φ(x)[a] for an assignment a with ai(x) = [c]. This
implies that φ(c) ∈ ⋂Σ∗i . Because of the interpretation constraint we have
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that ψ(
i→
c ) ∈ ⋂Σ∗j and also ∃x.x = i→c ∈ Σ∗j . This means that a can be
extended with aj(
i→
x ) = [
i→
c ] andMc |= φ(i→x )[a′].
LetMc be the canonical model built for (Γ,Σ), i :¬φ and let a be an assign-
ment which assigns all variables x to [x]. It is easy to see that M |= Γ[a], and
M |= e(Σ)[a], butM 6|= i :∧i:σ∈Σ σ ⊃ φ[a]. This concludes the completeness
proof.
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